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“That which one man has invented, all the world can imitate. Without the
assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost always be driven out of the
market by his rivals, who finding himself, without any expense, in possession of a
discovery which has cost the inventor much time and expense, would be able to
deprive him of all his deserved advantages, by selling at a lower price.”
-

Jeremy Bentham1

“Maintaining monopolies for medicine for poor countries during a worldwide
health catastrophe is unethical and immoral”2
- Paul Davis, Health GAP Coalition
I.

INTRODUCTION

The AIDS epidemic turned the world’s attention to the problem of high drug
prices in developing countries and the numerous barriers to access to essential drugs in
these countries. The AIDS epidemic also triggered an extensive debate on the
relationship between patents,3 global trade agreements, particularly the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS Agreement”)4, and public health

1

JEREMY BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 71 (1839).
Paul Davis is a spokesperson for Health Gap, an organization of U.S.-based AIDS and human rights
activists who campaign against policies that deny treatment to millions and increase the spread of HIV. See
http://www.healthgap.org/hgap/about.html.
3
A patent can be simply defined as “an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a
process that provides a new way of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A
patent provides protection for the invention to the owner of the patent. The protection is granted for a
limited period, generally 20 years.” See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Inventions
(Patents), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/patents.html.
4
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 33 I.L.M. 81, 108 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
The TRIPS Agreement is arguably one of the most controversial of the Uruguay Round
Agreements and has been the subject of numerous articles and commentaries. See generally, Frederick M.
Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crisis: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER
L. SYMP. J. 71 (2001); Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
859 (2002); ROBERT L. OSTERGARD, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (2003); Haochen Sun, A Wider Access
to Patented Drugs Under the TRIPS Agreement, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101 (2003).
2
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and raised important questions about the role of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)5
in promoting access to medicine in developing countries. Before November 2001, the
core questions were: whether the TRIPS Agreement retarded access to essential medicine
in developing countries by raising the cost of patented pharmaceuticals,6 whether
compulsory licensing in developing countries was needed to address the problem of
access in these countries, and whether the TRIPS Agreement permitted countries to resort
to compulsory license to address public health problems.7
At the 2001 Ministerial Conference8 in Doha, Qatar, WTO Members adopted the
“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (“Doha Declaration”).9 The
Doha Declaration was groundbreaking in the sense that it appeared to unequivocally
recognize the primacy of public health over commercial interests.10 The Declaration
answered in the affirmative the question whether WTO Member States can resort to
compulsory licensing to address a public health crisis. However, the Declaration left one
5

The WTO is an organization established in 1994 to provide a common institutional framework for the
conduct of trade relations among Member States. One of the basic functions of the WTO is to facilitate the
implementation, administration and operation of multilateral trade agreements. See Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (Marrakesh, April 15,
1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
6
Bibek Debroy, TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate, The Compulsory License Anomaly (July
2001), available at http://www.policynetwork.net/print/debroy.htm.
7
When a government grants compulsory license, the patent holder retains intellectual property rights and is
generally entitled to an adequate remuneration. In the pharmaceutical sector, a generic drug is a
bioequivalent of a patented drug and is usually intended to be used interchangeably with the original
patented drug. A generic drug is not produced under a patent. Under most domestic patent law,
governments can issue compulsory license to allow a competitor to produce a patented product or process
under license and subject to conditions aimed to safeguarding the legitimate interests of the patent owner.
8
The Ministerial Conference is the highest forum in the structure of the WTO. The Ministerial Conference
is composed of representatives of all the WTO Members and meets at least once every two years. Since the
establishment of the WTO, the Ministerial Conference has been held five times: Singapore (December
1996), Geneva (May 1998), Seattle (November – December 1999), Doha (November 2001), and Cancun
(September 2003).
9
The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted on November 14, 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (November 20, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ thewto_e/
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
10
Sun, supra note 4, at 104 (noting that the Doha Declaration “marked a turning point for political and
legal relations at the WTO.”).
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thorny question unresolved, the question whether WTO Members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector and who are thus unable to make
use of compulsory licensing can import generic drugs manufactured under compulsory
license from other countries (the so-called Paragraph 6 question).
Between November 2001 and September 2003, fresh debates ensued over the
Paragraph 6 question. To allay the fears of developing countries, two decisions were
made by the TRIPS Council and the General Council respectively in 2002. On June 27,
2002, the Council on TRIPS, acting under paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration, made a
decision to grant the least-developed country Members of the WTO an extension on the
time within which they have to comply with some of the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement.11 On July 8, 2002, the General Council adopted a decision waiving the
obligation of least developed countries (“LDC’s”) under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS
Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products.12 Finally, on August 30, 2003, at a

11

Decision on the Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for LeastDeveloped Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision
of the Council for TRIPS of June 27, 2002, PRESS/301 (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/pres02_e/pr301_e.htm [hereinafter Extension Decision 1].
Paragraph 1 of the decision states: “Least-developed country Members will not be obliged, with
respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS
Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016.” Paragraph 2
provides that, “[t]his decision is made without prejudice to the right of least-developed country Members to
seek other extensions of the period provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement.”
On the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, all WTO Members except developing countries and
least-developed countries had one year after the entry into force of the Agreement to comply with the
provisions of the Agreement. Except for obligations relating to national treatment and most-favored nation
which became applicable after the expiration of one year, developing countries received an additional
transition period of four years. Under paragraph 1 of Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement, least-developed
countries had received a ten-year extension on the date stipulated for WTO Members to implement the
TRIPS Agreement. This meant that they were not expected to implement most provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement until 2005. With the June 27, 2002, Decision of the Council for TRIPS, the least developed
countries do not have to implement the TRIPS Agreement until 2016.
12
Least-Developed Country Members — Obligations Under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with
Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of July 8, 2002, available at
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr301_e.htm [hereinafter Extension Decision 2].
Paragraph 1 states that “[t]he obligations of least-developed country Members under paragraph 9
of Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products until
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meeting of the WTO General Council13 world trade ministers adopted the Decision on the
Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health (“2003 Decision on Implementation” or “Decision”)14 that appears to
finally lay to rest the lingering questions regarding the relationship between patent rights,
the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicine.
The different battles over the relationship between patents and public health now
appear to be over. This article takes a close look at the battlefield more than three years
after the war began. It is an attempt to access gains and map progress. In this paper, I
argue that although the several battles over access may have ended, determining what
exactly has been achieved and forecasting the potential impact of the Doha Declaration
and the 2003 Decision on Implementation on access to medicine in developing countries
may not be easy. It may therefore be a long time before the suffering masses in the Third
World derive any tangible benefit from the two texts. There are several reasons for this.
First, both the Doha Declaration and 2003 Decision on Implementation have major
loopholes that could still be used to curtail the rights of developing countries in the
future. Second, for countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity, the 2003

1 January 2016.” Paragraph 2 states that “[t]his waiver shall be reviewed by the Ministerial Conference
not later than one year after it is granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver terminates, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement.”
Article 70(9) provides: “[W]here a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in
accordance with paragraph 8(a), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstanding the provisions
of Part VI, for a period of five years after obtaining marketing approval in that Member or until a product
patent is granted or rejected in that Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed and a patent granted for that
product in another Member and marketing approval obtained in such other Member.”
13
The WTO General Council is composed of representatives of all the Member States. The General
Council meets as appropriate and conducts the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the intervals
between meetings of the latter. See WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Article IV.2.
14
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
Decision of the General Council of August 30, 2003, WT/L/540 (September 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm [hereinafter 2003 Decision on
Implementation].
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Decision of Implementation contains conditions that are somewhat burdensome and that
could discourage the emergence of a robust generic industry in needed pharmaceuticals.
Third, it is doubtful that developing countries will begin to grant compulsory license as
envisaged in the two texts. For one thing, developed countries could still use covert
threats of economic sanctions and other forms of political pressure to compel developing
countries to respect the intellectual property rights (“IPR’s”) of patent holders. In
addition, quite apart from political pressures from developed countries, the reality is that
“[f]ew compulsory licenses have ever been granted in developing countries.”15
The most important but hitherto overlooked problems, however, are the problems
of abuse of patent rights and anticompetitive practices by pharmaceutical companies and
the absence of comprehensive rules at the global level to address these problems. In the
United States (“U.S.”), brand-name pharmaceutical companies, in their attempt to
maintain their dominant market share, are increasingly resorting to a host of abusive and
anticompetitive practices. Despite the existence of strong antitrust laws in the U.S. and a
multitude of laws and regulations directed at protecting U.S. consumers from false
business practices, pharmaceutical companies find ingenious ways to evade the law and
prey on vulnerable consumers. A study of unfolding law suits in the United States teaches
that in the absence of strong antitrust rules at the domestic level and a multilateral
agreement on competition law at the global level, pharmaceutical companies will find
ways to avoid the consequences of the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on
Implementation. In other words, the nature of competition in the pharmaceutical industry
and the capacity of states and/or the WTO to regulate competition in the industry may
15

JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 382
(2001).
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ultimately determine the overall effect the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on
Implementation will have on access to medicine in poor countries absent the development
of a strong ethical code of conduct to guide practices in the pharmaceutical industry.
In pursuing my argument, I examine and attempt to draw lessons from the present
war against abuse of patent rights and anti-competitive practices in the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry. The U.S. experience suggests that in the absence of strong
public and private oversight, a host of abuses are possible in the pharmaceutical industry.
One such abuse is in the form of collusive settlement agreements between brand name
drug manufacturers and generic drug manufacturers that have the effect of delaying the
entry of generic drugs into the market. These cases suggest the need, beyond wellintended legal solutions, for public oversight and vigilance by consumer groups and nongovernmental organizations.
Undoubtedly, there are strong and compelling reasons why IPR’s must be
respected and accorded maximum protection; there are, however, other values worth
protecting besides intellectual property rights. IPR’s operate as an incentive for the
development of new and useful technology, including pharmaceuticals.16 IPR’s,
particularly patents, are important to the pharmaceutical industry for two reasons. First,
frequently the industry has to invest considerable amount of time and resources into
researching and developing new drugs.17 Second, “pharmaceuticals are generally
relatively easy to reverse-engineer and thus are open to easy copying in the absence of …

16

Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface
Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 363,
372 (2000) (“There exists an important relationship between a strong patent regime and Research and
Development ….”).
17
Id. at 373 (observing that research into new drugs is risky, expensive and time consuming).
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protection.”18 For developing countries, the protection of IPR’s can also encourage the
transfer of technology from developed countries.19 Because IPR’s are commercial rights
essentially driven towards economic gains,20 they can and do frequently affect the
welfare of the general public. This means that when IPR’s are discussed, the emphasis
must not be exclusively on the rights of producers of intellectual property (“IP”),
particularly patent holders. Rather, IPR’s must be discussed and examined also from the
perspective of consumers and the general welfare of a nation.21
Overall, I conclude that the battle over access to medicine was not a waste. It is
necessary that the WTO clarify the flexibilities countries enjoy under the TRIPS
Agreement to address their domestic problems. Even if developing countries do not fully
exercise their right to grant compulsory license in the future, the existence of such a right
can function as a powerful weapon for bargaining lower prices from brand-name
pharmaceutical companies.22 Compulsory license can be a solution to the problem of
patent exclusivity; it is frequently used to remedy certain antitrust violations involving
IPR’s. However, compulsory licenses can also trigger or encourage a range of abusive
practices in the pharmaceutical industry as affected companies struggle to maintain their
market share and dominant position.
The debate over access to medicine underscored the fact that there are obvious
political, social, economic and policy implications when states decide to adopt strong
18

Id.
Id. at 364 (arguing that “a strong patent protection regime has a net global social gain, as well as a net
social gain to developing countries”).
20
Id.
21
OSTERGARD, JR., supra note 4, at 12.
22
As a result of threat by the Brazilian government to issue a compulsory license, Roche, the Swiss
pharmaceutical company, agreed to a substantial price cut for Nelfinavir, a patented AIDS drug. See
DUNCAN MATTHEWS , GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 115
(2002).
19
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intellectual property protection,23 and the fact that “all states are not equal in their level of
political and economic development”24 – something that was ignored during the
negotiations that produced the TRIPS Agreement.25 The TRIPS Agreement was the
product of aggressive negotiation by developed countries governments and “bound all
signatory states to implementing a full Western-style IP regime.”26 Unwittingly,
developing countries signed on to the TRIPS Agreement largely as a result of intense
pressure from developed countries but without addressing the potential social and
economic costs of their action.27
In the final analysis, the pharmaceutical industry cannot be the enemy for three
reasons. First, the battle over access to medicine arose primarily because medicines are
essential goods and yet their production does require substantial and very expensive
technological in-put. The nature of drugs inevitably means that pharmaceutical
companies have a unique type of financial and social responsibility – they provide
important public goods.28 Second, although WTO Members now appear to have the
freedom to issue compulsory license to address their health problems, the cooperation of

23

OSTERGARD, JR., supra note 4, at 2 (observing that states do not adopt strong intellectual property rights
policies as a matter of rationale economic policy only, but also as a matter of rationale political policy).
24
Id. at 3.
25
Id. at 7 (observing that the US argued forcefully that there were international benefits to be derived from
global protection of intellectual property rights without regard for where countries were in their
development process).
26
OSTERGARD, JR., supra note 4, at 1 (observing that the TRIPS Agreement was a result, in part, of the
strong lobbying effort by the United States). Developed countries were the strongest proponents of the
TRIPS Agreement because of changes in their industrial base and the rise of intense global competition.
Essentially, as the comparative advantage of Western nations shifted from agricultural products and
manufacturing to sectors that require high technological in-put, these countries became anxious to see
intellectual property rights globalized . Id. at 7.
27
Id. at 7 (noting that the United States pressured governments of developing countries into accepting
stringent intellectual property rights regulation).
28
Anna Thomas, Street Price: A Global Approach to Drug Pricing for Developing Countries 5, a Position
Paper for the Voluntary Service Organization or “VSO” (Ken Bluestone et al eds.), available at
http://vso.org.uk/publications/positionpapers/pdfs/street_price.pdf. See also Singham, supra note 16, at
365 (noting that patents enable the industry to provide a very important public good).

9

patent holders will still be crucial for countries to obtain the technology needed to
effectively work the patent. Third, given my predictions that it is not likely that many
developing countries will actually issue compulsory licenses in the future, countries may
still have to rely on the goodwill of pharmaceutical companies to meet their
pharmaceutical needs through alternative channels.
This paper is in five sections. Section II offers a background to the Multilateral
Trading System (“MTS”), the TRIPS Agreement, and the compulsory licensing debate as
it has unfolded since the explosion of the AIDS epidemic. Section III introduces the
reader to the 2003 Decision on Implementation and highlights the main provisions of the
Decision. In Section IV, I engage in a critical analysis of the 2003 Decision on
Implementation. Section V focuses on pharmaceutical abuses in the United States and the
current efforts by the FTC and the private sector to fight these abuses. In Section VI, I
examine current efforts to establish a multilateral framework on competition law and
policy and the obstacles to these efforts. Paradoxically, although many developing
countries do not have any competition law and are likely to benefit from such a
framework, developing countries have strongly opposed the idea of a multilateral rule on
competition policy. I conclude in Section VII by noting that although welcomed, despite
the flexibilities afforded by the Doha Declaration and the Decision, few compulsory
licenses will be issued.
I advance seven reasons for my position. First, very few countries have the
capacity to effectively exploit a compulsory license should one be issued; also very few
countries have internal procedures for granting compulsory licenses.29 Second,

29

MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114.
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developing countries that are starved of foreign exchange and desiring to attract foreign
direct investment would most likely refrain from liberally utilizing the flexibilities.30
Third, developing countries that desire to encourage inventive activity locally may also
not want to liberally use compulsory licenses as this “could work against the interests of
new domestic actors and have adverse demonstration effect on other potential
investors.”31 Fifth, in situations where the cooperation of the right holder is needed to
acquire the technology needed to work with the protected invention, such cooperation
may not be forthcoming.32
The intersection of patent rights, global trade, public health and ethics unearthed
many thorny issues. For example, is a balance between intellectual property rights, state
sovereignty and ethics possible? Should ethical concerns and human rights norms trump
over property (patent) rights? Do the sovereign rights of states allow them the option of
“opting out” of onerous and “mischievous” international obligations? Does the TRIPS
Agreement prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health?

II.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: BACKGROUND TO THE TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY (“TRIPS”) AGREEMENT
AND THE COMPULSORY LICENSING DEBATE

The last three hundred years has witnessed tremendous evolution in our notion of
property. From its once humble beginnings focused on tangibles, the notion of property
has broadened to include intangible products of the human mind such as patents,
30

In effect, the granting of compulsory license has its drawbacks and should not be seen as the preferred
option for countries. See MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114 (noting that “foreign companies may be
reluctant to invest in developing countries with a propensity to grant compulsory licenses.”).
31
WATAL, supra note 15, at 382.
32
Id.
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trademarks and copyrights. For the most part, this development in the notion of property
occurred primarily in Europe and North America.33 As long as information could be
contained within national borders, domestic law was considered sufficient in regulating
dealings in intellectual property. Intangible property are however much more fluid than
tangible property and transverse national boundaries much more readily. By the end of
the 19th century, counterfeiting and piracy in the global marketplace had become a strong
concern of many countries; in the industrialized world, there was a growing realization
that multilateral efforts were needed to address these concerns. This triggered a centurylong effort directed at expanding and universalizing intellectual property laws (what I
refer to as “the globalization project”) culminating in the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement in 1994.34

A. The TRIPS Agreement
Initial efforts to globalize and harmonize intellectual property law produced two
significant international treaties: the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”)35 and the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”).36 However, January 1, 1995, marked a major
turning point in the globalization project with the entry into force of the TRIPS

33

For literature on the history and development of intellectual property in the West, see BRUCE BUGBEE,
GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 166 (1948); Giulio Mandich, Venetial Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARKE OFF. SOC’Y 166 (1948); F.D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787,
26 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944).
34
For an interesting history of the globalization of intellectual property rights and the role of international
institutions and global corporate actors in this effort, see generally, MATTHEWS, supra note 22.
35
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html [hereinafter Berne Convention].
36
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/index.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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Agreement.37 Negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations,38 the TRIPS Agreement comes as a package-deal meaning that all WTO
Members are automatically bound by the agreement.39
In terms of coverage, the TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive
multilateral instrument on intellectual property rights.40 The TRIPS Agreement is
innovative in at least five ways. First, the TRIPS Agreement represents the first time in
the history of multilateral trade negotiations that intellectual property has been integrated
into an international trade agreement. Second, compared to preexisting instruments, the
TRIPS Agreement contains a detailed provision on enforcement and imposes detailed
obligations on States.41 Third, the TRIPS agreement establishes a strong monitoring and
supervisory scheme through the machinery of the TRIPS Council, a marked departure
from the norm in previous conventions.42 Fourth, the TRIPS Agreement addresses

37

For literature on the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement, see generally, Frank Emmert,
Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized
Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1317 (1990); G.E. Evana, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The
Making of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 WORLD
COMPETITION 2, 137-180 (1994); D. Gervais, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
(1998).
38
The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
The agreement is annexed to the final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Punta del Este, Uruguay (September 20, 1986), reprinted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round].
39
With the exception of four “plurilateral” agreements, all the WTO agreements apply to all WTO
members. With one signature, WTO members each accepted all the Uruguay Round agreements as one
single package. See World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Introduction (“The WTO framework ensures a
‘single undertaking approach’ to the results of the Uruguay Round – thus, membership in the WTO entails
accepting all the results of the Round without exception.”).
40
The TRIPS Agreement deals with all types of intellectual property rights. The agreement covers:
Copyright and Related Rights (Section 1); Trademarks (Section 2); Geographical Indications (Section 3);
Industrial Designs (Section 4); Patents (Section 5); Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits
(Section 6); Protection of Undisclosed Information (Section 7); and Control of Anti-Competitive Practices
in Contractual Licences (Section 8).
41
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Articles 41 – 49.
42
Id. at Article 68 (“The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of this Agreement and, in
particular, Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the
opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.”).
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compliance and enforcement questions through its automatic linkage with the WTO
dispute settlement system; this ensures a permanent quasi-judicial, dispute resolution
mechanism to address intellectual property controversies.43 Finally, WTO Members
cannot enter a reservation in respect of any of the provisions of the Agreement without
the consent of the other Members.44 Overall, the TRIPS Agreement offers an
institutionalized, multilateral, and comprehensive mechanism for addressing intellectual
property-related issues and disputes.45
The success of the globalization project is reflected in the minimum substantive
and procedural standards of protection for intellectual property protection that the TRIPS
Agreement establishes. With respect to patents, the agreement lays down standards
relating to patentablility, scope of patent protection, limitations on patent rights, and
enforcement. Article 27 stipulates that patents shall be available “for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”46 and that “patents
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.”47

43

The dispute settlement mechanism was established pursuant to a separate agreement. See The Uruguay
Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm.
44
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 71.
45
Debroy, supra note 6 (noting that WTO is “a better forum for establishing global norms in IP, not only
because more countries are members of the WTO, but also because the WTO system ensures enforcement
and compliance through the dispute resolution and retaliation provisions.”).
46
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 27 (emphasis added).
47
Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Globalization Amidst Growing Discontent
The TRIPS Agreement exposes the North-South asymmetries in global trading
arrangements.48 To developed-country governments, the TRIPS Agreement was
conceived primarily as an instrument to combat global counterfeiting and piracy,
eliminate distortions in and barriers to global trade, allow the industry to recoup research
and development (“R&D”) costs, and guarantee a fair return on investment in innovative
research.49 These goals, they argued, must be met within the context of limited monopoly
granted by patents. During the negotiation for the TRIPS Agreement, multinational
corporations and developed-country governments also argued that an enhanced global IP
regime would facilitate long-term economic development in developing countries by
fostering technology and investment flow to the later.50
To some non-governmental organizations and some developing-country
governments, however, the TRIPS Agreement is but one component of a broader policy
of technological protectionism “aimed at consolidating an international division of labour
whereunder Northern countries generate innovations and Southern countries constitute
the market for the resulting products and services.”51 The real motivation for TRIPS,
some have argued, was to “freeze the comparative advantages” that had ensured Northern

48

Numerous articles have been written on the subject of North-South asymmetries in international trade.
Several articles have also explored the implications of the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries. See
generally, CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000); Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of
TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245 (1994);
E. Durán and Constantine Michalopoulos, Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries in the
WTO Millenium Round, 2 (6) J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 853 (1999).
49
CORREA, supra note 48, at 4.
50
MATTHEWS, supra note 22.
51
CORREA, supra note 48, at 5 (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement aims at stifling imitative paths to
industrialization).

15

technological supremacy and counter Northern countries’ declining competitive position
in the global market.52
Viewed also from the perspective of developing countries, critics also argue that
the trend is not really towards a globalization of intellectual property rights or IPR’s
(suggesting a convergence of norms and harmonization of standards), but really a
universalization of standards of protection that is Northern-grown53 and suitable for
industrialized countries.54 In other words, given developing countries’ dependence upon
innovations made in the North55 and their negligible share of the world market in
medium- and high-tech goods,56 it is believed that industrialized countries have the most
to benefit from the TRIPS Agreement.
Finally, there is also the perception in the developing world that the TRIPS
Agreement could be used to prevent poor countries from achieving important social and
developmental goals. The fear is that by ignoring the profound differences in economic
52

Id. (noting the TRIPS Agreement was “an expression of an aggressive action by the United States to
establish international rules that counter their declining competition in world markets.”).
53
Id. (noting that in negotiating the TRIPS Agreement, industrialized countries had the objective of
universalizing the standards of intellectual property protection that they had incorporated into their
legislation. He notes further that the emerging framework of intellectual property protection in the TRIPS
Agreement “basically universalizes standards of protection that are suitable for industrialized countries.”).
See also, UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (“[T]he protection
contained in the TRIPS Agreement focuses on forms of protection that have developed in industrialized
countries. For example, in the case of patents, the protection in the Agreement is most relevant to the
protection of modern forms of technology, such as biotechnology, and most relevant to innovators situated
in a selected number of industrialized countries.”).
54
Some scholars question whether developing countries are really ready to have strong intellectual property
rights. They point to the fact that industrialized countries were also able to establish higher standards for
intellectual property protection after they had attained a certain level of technological and industrial
capacity. CORREA, supra note 48, at 5.
55
Id. (citing studies by Nagesh that estimate that of the patents granted in the United States between 1977
and 1996, developing countries accounted for less than 2%, while 95% of 1,650,800 patents granted were
conferred on applicants from 10 industrialized countries). See KUMAR NAGESH, TECHNOLOGY
GENERATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: RECENT TRENDS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5-9 (1997).
56
Id. (citing estimates by Alcorta and Peres to the effect that of the exports of the Group of 7 (G7) to
OECD countries, 56.7% consist of medium- and high-tech goods). See LUDOVICO ALCORTA AND WILSON
PERES, INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY SPECIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
5-6 (1995).
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and technological capabilities between the North and the South and by offering a onesize-fits-all approach to intellectual property protection, the TRIPS Agreement will be
progressively used to curtail policy options in developing countries and hamper States in
their efforts to address serious health emergencies.

C. The Pharmaceutical Industry, AIDS Epidemic and the Compulsory
License Debate
The pharmaceutical industry is at the center of the debate about the relationship
between patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement, and public health. Until recently, “the
patent law of most poor countries exempted pharmaceutical products from patents.”57 As
a result of the TRIPS Agreement, however, many countries amended or are in the process
of amending their patent law to comply with TRIPS. In the wake of huge AIDS
epidemics decimating millions of lives in the developing world, how to balance the patent
right of pharmaceutical corporations against the sovereign rights of states to determine
their internal health policies and ensure that essential drugs are available and accessible
to their citizens surfaced. Also, the question how to balance the patent rights of
pharmaceutical corporations against core internationally guaranteed rights such as the
right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,”58 assumed a
central place in this debate.59 Essentially, developing countries governments, civil society

57

Julian Morris, TRIPS and Healthcare: Rethinking the Debate, Introduction and Summary (July 2001),
available at http://www.policynetwork.net/pring/morris.htm. See also MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 114
(observing that for many developing countries “the underlying rationale for excluding pharmaceutical
products from patent protection in the pre-TRIPS era was to enhance access to medicine and healthcare.”).
58
See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp. 16) at 49, U.N. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force January 3, 1976.
(Article 12 provides: “The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”).
59
For a human rights analysis of the TRIPS Agreement, see United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights:
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groups and AIDS sufferers feared that the TRIPS Agreement could be used to disrupt the
availability of cheap generic pharmaceutical products and that developing countries
would be forced to obtain brand-name pharmaceutical products from multinational
companies at exorbitant prices.

i. The AIDS Epidemic: As of December 2001, the total number of people (adult
and children) living with HIV/AIDS (“PLHA”) was estimated at 40 million60 and the
total number of children orphaned by AIDS and living was estimated at 14 million.61 Of
the total number of PLHA, 95% live in the developing world.62 Five million people
became newly infected with HIV in 2001 and 3 million AIDS deaths were recorded in the
same year.63
The discovery of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (“HAART”) as a
treatment for AIDS led to a paradigm shift in most of the industrialized world because
HARRT brought about significant reduction in the prevalence of AIDS-related morbidity
and mortality in the West. In the West, it became possible to view AIDS not as a death
sentence but as a manageable chronic disease.64 However, in most of the developing
world the story was different. As a result of the absence of HAART, instead of

Report of the High Commissioner, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, June 27, 2001, at 3 (noting that the TRIPS
Agreement could affect the enjoyment of several rights including the right to food, the right to
development, and the human rights of indigenous peoples).
60
See JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC,
8 (2002) (hereinafter REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC). See also, JOHANNES VAN DAM AND
SHERRY A. HUTCHINSON, ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS: REPORT OF A MEETING OF
INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS, JUNE 12-13, 2001, 1 (2002), [hereinafter ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR
HIV/AIDS].
61
REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC, supra note 60, at 8.
62
ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS, supra note 60, at 1.
63
REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC, supra note 60, at 8.
64
ACCESS TO TREATMENT FOR HIV/AIDS, supra note 60, at 3 (“…in the United States, the number of
PLHA increased from 174,244 in 1993 to 317,368 in 1999, while mortality associated with AIDS
decreased from 45, 494 to 16, 767 in that same period.”).
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treatment, the focus of national programs and international support was on prevention,
the treatment of opportunistic infections, care, and support.65 The principle barrier to
treatment frequently cited by national governments and donor agencies was the cost of
HAART (estimated at US$10-$15,000 per person per year in 2001).66 Thus, as of 2001,
despite breakthroughs in medicine, only 230,000 of the 6 million people who were sick
enough to require HAART were receiving it. Of these, half lived in Brazil.67 This meant
that at least 96% of people in developing countries who needed treatment were not
receiving it.

ii. Does TRIPS Provide an Answer? Against the backdrop of a massive
HIV/AIDS epidemic and reported welfare effects of pharmaceutical product patents in
developing countries,68 some governments in the developing world began to explore the
possibility of using compulsory licenses to lower drug prices. These countries acted on
65

Id.
Id. (other reasons cited included the capacity of health care delivery systems and the ability of patients to
adhere to lifelong treatment regimens).
67
In Brazil, the government instituted a universal access to AIDS treatment program. This led to a 54%
reduction in AIDS-related mortality between 1995 and 1999. Treatment provision has resulted in overall
cost-savings for the government, in terms of avoided hospitalization and reduction in the burden of
opportunistic infections, totaling US$677 million between 1997 and 1999. Some observers attribute the
success in Brazil to the government’s aggressive involvement in the manufacture of generic versions of
several HIV drugs in its own government laboratories. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIDS SERVICE
ORGANIZATIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT
OF NATIONAL RESPONSES IN IMPROVING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS TREATMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK 11
(2002) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON AIDS & HUMAN RIGHTS].
68
Poor developing nations appear to be the most affected by global patent protection laws. In many
countries, welfare losses which economists attribute to heightened patent protection are beginning to
appear. Nogués, a World Bank economist, estimates that minimum welfare loss to developing countries of
patent pharmaceutical products would amount to a minimum of US$3.5 billion and a maximum of US$10.8
billion, while the income gains by foreign patent owners would be between US$2.1 billion and US$14.4
billion. . Julio Nogués, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on Developing
Countries, 24 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 6 (1990) (cited in CORREA, supra note 48, at 35) Several studies in
developing countries support Nogués conclusions. These studies point to the appearance of about a six-fold
increase of drug prices with the introduction of product patents compared to non-patented products, a
strong correlation between the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents and significant (as much as
45%) reduction in the consumption of medicine, and wide disparities in prices of drugs between countries
where patent protection exists and countries with no protection. Id.
66
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the assumption that the TRIPS Agreement allowed governments to address critical
shortages in essential drugs through compulsory license. However, countries that
attempted to address domestic health crisis through compulsory licensing came under
heavy attack from the pharmaceutical industry69 and from some governments in the
developed world, particularly the U.S. government.70
The problem was that even though the TRIPS Agreement addresses conditions for
the grant of compulsory licenses and does appear to allow governments some flexibility
to enable them address domestic crisis, the entire agreement is riddled with ambiguities
and permits multiple interpretations. What flexibilities does the TRIPS Agreement afford
governments? First, governments can exclude certain inventions from patentability.71
Second, pursuant to Article 30, governments can place some exceptions on the rights of a
patent holder provided such exceptions do not “unreasonably” conflict with the normal
exploitation of the patent.72 Third, WTO Members are allowed to control anti-

69

In 2001, a group of multinational drug companies took the South African government to court for
attempting to import generic versions of AIDS drugs from India. The multinational companies were forced
to withdraw their suit after adverse media attention. See USA Today, Drug companies Drop Lawsuit
Against South Africa, June 19, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001-04-19drugsuit.htm.
70
Past attempts by South Africa, Thailand, and Brazil to compulsorily license the manufacture of critical
drugs for treating HIV/AIDS resulted in threatened economic sanctions from the U.S. Government and
invocation of the WTO dispute settlement procedure by the U.S. Government. See generally, OSTERGARD,
JR., supra note 4 (in chapter six entitled “Life, Death and Intellectual Property: The South Africa-US
Patent Dispute,” Ostergard Jr. discusses attempts by the United States to get the South African government
to adjust its patent laws to enhance protection for pharmaceutical patents).
71
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 27 (2) (“Members may exclude from patentability inventions,
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by their law.”).
See also, Article 27(3) of TRIPS under which WTO Members are permitted to exclude from
patentability: “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals” and
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.”
72
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 30 (“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal

20

competitive practices and prevent abuse of rights by patent holders.73 Fourth, parallel
importing is very possible under the TRIPS Agreement.74 Most important, the
preamble,75 Article 7 (“Objectives”)76 and Article 8 (“Principles”)77 of the TRIPS
Agreement provide a broad framework for interpretation that, if followed, would have
allowed for a balanced result in the debate.
Regarding compulsory licenses, although Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement
appeared to accord WTO Members broad rights to grant compulsory licenses,78 a debate
ensued regarding the precise scope of the flexibility permitted governments and the
precise grounds for which compulsory license may be issued.79
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”).
73
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 8(2) (“Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by
right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology.”).
74
Parallel import permits countries to search for the lowest price for parented products worldwide and
import from the lowest source. It is based on the principal that once a patent-holder sells goods, he has lost
his right to control the resale of those goods; in other words, he is said to have “exhausted” his property
rights in the product. The TRIPS Agreement is vague on the subject and arguably left the issue of parallel
importing unaddressed. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 6 (Article 6 provides: “For the
purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing
in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).
75
In the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, Members recognize "the underlying public policy objectives of
national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological
objectives." Members also recognize "the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect
of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to
create a sound and viable technological base,” and the fact that “patent rights cannot be paramount to
overarching public policies, in particular health policies."
76
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”).
77
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Article 8(1) (“Members may, in formulating or amending their laws
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”).
78
Article 31 outlines the conditions a government must meet when issuing a compulsory license. What
conditions? First, there must be a prior effort to negotiate a voluntary license with the patent holder on
“reasonable commercial terms” and within a reasonable period. This requirement is waived in the case of a
“national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”
See Article 31(b). Second, “the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it
was authorized.” See Article 31(c). Third, the patent owner is to be paid “adequate remuneration …taking
into account the economic value of the authorization.” See Article 31(h).

21

The pharmaceutical industry argued that the relationship between TRIPS, patents
and access to medicine was tenuous at best.80 According to the industry, the causes of
lack of access to essential drugs in developing countries were legion and generally
included official corruption, misguided taxation, systemic poverty, exorbitant retail
markups and the general lack of infrastructure.81 The argument, thus, was that patent
protection is but “a very small part of a much bigger issue”82 and that compulsory license
should be allowed only in very limited circumstances. Essentially, while welcoming the
TRIPS Agreement, the industry called for a tightening of the provisions of the
Agreement.83
Developing countries, on the other hand, view compulsory license as a critical
pathway to ensuring low-cost drugs. By facilitating generic entry and generic
competition, they argued, it would be possible to ensure that essential drugs are
accessible, available and affordable. While avowing commitment to the TRIPS
Agreement, developing countries were of the view that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement
reduced the range of options available to governments to promote and protect public

79

In the light of efforts by countries such as United States to “punish” countries that attempted to exercise
their rights under Article 31 and a lawsuit filed against the South African Government by a group of
pharmaceutical companies, developing countries began to push for a clarification of Article 31. Developing
countries wanted a common understanding that confirm the right of governments to make use of the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement whenever the exercise of intellectual property rights result in barriers
to access to essential drugs. At a TRIPS Council meeting of 2-6 April 2001, the decision was made to hold
a special session to initiate discussions on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement based on a proposal by the Africa Group. See World Trade Organization, Council
for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights, Submission by the African Group, Barbados,
Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, IP/C/W/296, June 29, 2001, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter Submission by the African Group].
80
Debroy, supra note 6, at 3.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
The following websites have helpful information: www.ifpma.org (International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) and www.phrma.org (Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America).
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health84 nor placed a restriction on the purposes for which compulsory license could be
issued.85 Developing countries also pointed to the fact that some developed countries
were great users of compulsory licenses.86
Domestic and international Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGO’s”) and
AIDS support groups also argued that TRIPS put profit over human lives in the
developing world. By forbidding the easy and cheap copying of patented drugs, these
groups argued, the TRIPS Agreement constrained the ability of developing-countries to
address immediate loss to the welfare of domestic consumers.87 The solution, they
argued, was compulsory licensing.

III. THE DOHA DECLARATION AND
THE 2003 DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION:
A REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW?
The Doha Declaration88 and the 2003 Decision on Implementation89 now appear
to lay to rest the different debates regarding compulsory licensing. The 2003 Decision on
Implementation was adopted by the General Council in the light of a “Statement of
Understanding” read out by the Chairperson of the General Council of the WTO.90 In this
84

Submission by the African Group, supra note 79, at 5.
Several scholars support the position that the TRIPS Agreement does not limit the grounds upon which
compulsory license may be issued. See CORREA, supra note 48, at 89-90 (arguing that although the TRIPS
Agreement refers to five specific grounds for the granting of compulsory license, the Agreement did not
limit the members rights to establish compulsory license on other grounds not mentioned). See also
WATAL, supra note 15, at 380 (observing that the final text of Article 31 places no restrictions on the
purposes for which compulsory license could be authorized).
86
Submission by the African Group, supra note 79, at 28.
87
Debroy, supra note 6, at 3.
88
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
89
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
90
See World Trade Organization, The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, August 30, 2003,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm [hereinafter
Statement of Understanding]. The Chairperson of the General Council is Carlos Pérez del Castillo,
Uruguay’s ambassador to the WTO.
85
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section, I shall briefly highlight the key provisions of the Doha Declaration, bring readers
up to date on the Paragraph 6 question – the question that was left unaddressed in the
Doha Declaration, and extensively examine the 2003 Decision on Implementation. In
Part A, I examine the main provisions of the Doha Declaration. In Part B, I highlight the
main issues that arise in the Paragraph 6 question. In Part C, I highlight and critically
examine the main provisions of the 2003 Decision on Implementation. In Part D, I
examine the main contours of the Statement of Understanding issued by the Chairperson
of the General Council. A more detailed evaluation of the merits and demerits of the 2003
Decision on Implementation will be undertaken in Section IV.

A. The Doha Declaration
The Doha Declaration reiterates the importance of an effective intellectual
property regime for the development of new medicines while recognizing the concerns
about the effect of intellectual property on drug prices.91 The Doha Declaration also
stresses the need for the TRIPS Agreement to be part of wider national and international
action to address the public health problems afflicting many developing and leastdeveloped countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other epidemics.92 Paragraph four, one the most ambitious provisions in the declaration,
provides:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly,
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a

91
92

Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at para. 3.
Id. at para. 1-2.
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manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and,
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.93

Regarding the flexibilities permitted members under the TRIPS Agreement to
promote access to medicine, the Doha Declaration, reaffirms “the right of WTO Members
to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for
this purpose.”94 More specifically on compulsory licenses, the Doha Declaration states
that, “[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted”95 and that in deciding to
grant compulsory license “[e]ach Member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.”96
The Doha Declaration was undoubtedly a victory for developing countries. The
declaration is most useful to countries with local technological, productive and regulatory
capacity to support generic industries.97 Moreover, even if a country has sufficient
capacity to support local production, it may be economically inefficient “to require
domestic production for every medicine a country may need.”98 For countries with
insufficient manufacturing capacity and countries whose generic industries may not
operate on an economy of scale for every drug required domestically, the obvious

93

Id. at para. 4.
Id.
95
Id. at para. 5(b) (emphasis added).
96
Id. at para 5(c) (emphasis added).
97
Sun, supra note 4, at 107.
98
Id.
94
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solution is to import generic drugs manufactured under compulsory license from other
countries. However, the Doha Declaration did not decide the question whether such
importation of generic drugs manufactured under compulsory licenses was permitted.
Rather, Paragraph 6 reads:

We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.99

The Paragraph 6 issue triggered another year of debates, discussions and
negotiations in the WTO. Although the TRIPS Council considered a draft decision at the
end of December 2002, and despite approaching the year-end deadline stipulated in the
Doha Declaration, the issue remained unresolved as a result of the inability of WTO
Members to reach a consensus on the issue.

B. The Paragraph 6 Question
The Paragraph 6 question arises because of a restriction contained in Article 31(f)
of the TRIPS Agreement. 100 Article 31(f) appears to prohibit the export of products
manufactured under a compulsory license by specifying that a compulsory license shall
be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market authorizing such use.

99

Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at para. 6.
Article 31(f) states, “Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by
the government, the following provisions shall be respected:…. Any such use shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use” (emphasis
added).

100
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The rationale behind Article 31(f) “lies in the territorial nature of patent law and in the
need to avoid circumvention of patent rules.”101
As a result of Article 31(f), uses permitted by a compulsory license are limited to
those aimed at predominantly supplying the domestic market of the WTO Member
granting such a license. Although Article 31(f) does allow a non-predominant part of the
pharmaceutical product manufactured under compulsory license to be exported,
difficulties arise where a country lacking domestic manufacturing capability is seeking to
import massive quantities of generic drugs from the manufacturing country. As stated by
the United States in its communication to the WTO:
Difficulties could arise, therefore, when a country with insufficient
domestic manufacturing capacity and experiencing grave health problems
seeks to import a needed pharmaceutical from a manufacturer in a WTO
Member where a patent exists on that pharmaceutical. In this situation, it
currently would be inconsistent with Article 31(f) for that WTO Member
to grant a compulsory license to its manufacturer to produce the drug
solely for export to the country that has insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. It is this situation that the TRIPS
Council must address.102
WTO Members disagreed on the procedural mechanism needed to address the
problem as well as the substantive solution that was needed to address the problem. At a
March 2002 TRIPS Council meeting, four different solutions were proposed: (i) an
authoritative interpretation of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement;103 (ii) an amendment

101

See European Communities, Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States
to the TRIPS Council Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health (Brussels, June 18. 2002), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/intell/
intel3.htm [hereinafter EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6].
102
World Trade Organization, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health:
Second Communication from the United States, IP/C/W/358, July 9, 2002 [hereinafter Second
Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6].
103
Article 30 provides that “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.” An authoritative interpretation of Article 30 would have recognized the
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to Article 31 in order to overcome the Article 31(f) restriction;104 (iii)a moratorium on
dispute settlement with regard to the non-respect of the restriction under Article 31(f);105
and (iv) a temporary waiver with regard to Article 31(f).106

C. The 2003 Decision on Implementation

The 2003 Decision on Implementation takes the form of a provisional waiver to
Article 31(f) and allows countries to export generic drugs to third countries with no
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.107 The Decision pertains only to
pharmaceutical products.108 It lays out the obligation of exporting members, eligible
importing members, other members of the WTO, and the TRIPS Council. The Decision
includes safeguards against abuse and trade diversion and lays down rules to ensure
transparency. The Decision also contains provisions on transfer of technology and
regional cooperation. In the following section I shall outline the main provisions of the
Decision.

right of a WTO member to manufacture a patented drug for export to another country facing a public health
crisis without having to resort to compulsory licensing. Numerous NGO’s supported this solution. Article
XX:2 of the WTO Agreement stipulates the procedure for adopting official interpretation.
104
An Amendment to Article 31 would have been in the form of a new paragraph which would carve out
exceptions to the restrictions imposed by Article 31(f). The European Communities (“EC”) supported this
solution arguing that “[t]he insertion of a textual provision into the TRIPS Agreement itself has the
advantage of providing for a straightforward, clear, legally secure, effective and permanent solution within
an existing legal framework, i.e. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.” EC, Communications Relating to
Paragraph 6, supra note 101. See also, EC Communication to the TRIPS Council of March 4, 2002
(IP/C/W/339).
105
A moratorium on dispute settlement would have operated as a pledge by WTO Members not to
challenge any member that fails to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 31(f). The United States
initially proposed and strongly supported this solution.
106
See EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 5.
107
Paragraph 1 provides that “[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory license to the extent necessary
for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing
Member(s).”
108
2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 1, at para. 1.
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1. Qualifying Countries: Which countries will benefit from the system? Which
countries are excluded?
Only “eligible importing Members” can utilize the 2003 Decision on Implementation.
Eligible importing members means “any least-developed country Member, and any other
Member that has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the
system as an importer.”109 The category of importing members is potentially broad. The
only requirement is that a country wishing to use the system files a notification of intent
with the TRIPS Council. Some countries, mostly industrialized, have voluntarily decided
not to use the system as importing Members.110
An “exporting Member” simply means “a Member using the system set out in this
Decision to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an eligible
importing Member.”111 It appears to mean that any country with manufacturing
capacities, including industrialized countries, can export under this system.
2. Qualifying Products: Which products are covered by this system? What about
vaccines?
The Decision is strictly limited to pharmaceutical products which are defined in
paragraph 1 to mean “any patented product, or product manufactured through a
109

Id. (emphasis added).
Paragraph 1 notes that “some Members will not use the system set out in this Decision as importing
Members and that some other Members have stated that, if they use the system, it would be in no more than
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id. See also footnote 3 to
paragraph 1(b) (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America.). See also, Statement of Understanding, supra
note 90 (“Until their accession to the European Union, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia agree that they would only use the system as
importers in situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. These countries
further agree that upon their accession to the European Union, they will opt out of using the system as
importers . . . some other Members have agreed that they would only use the system as importers in
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency: Hong Kong China, Israel,
Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, United Arab Emirates.”).
111
2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 1
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patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health
problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration.”112 Active ingredients
necessary for the manufacture of the pharmaceutical products and diagnostic kits
needed for its use are also included in this definition. The definition of patented
products appears to be broad enough to allow countries to address legitimate public
health needs and would extend to vaccines.
3. Qualifying Diseases: What is the Disease Scope of the Decision?
The Decision does not contain a list of qualifying diseases for which the waiver may
be used – a major victory for developing countries. An effort by the U.S. to limit the
disease coverage led to a major deadlock in negotiations and made it impossible for WTO
Members to meet the 2002 year-end deadline stipulated in the Doha Declaration. In a
January 7, 2003 letter to Ministers of the WTO, the European Union (“EU”)
Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, suggested a compromise deal.113 The EU
proposed that the mechanism apply to an initial list of infectious epidemics “which are
generally recognised by health experts as those which have the most damaging impact on
developing countries,” with an added suggestion that Members wishing to import
medicines to meet a public health concern not explicitly covered in an initial list be
encouraged to seek the advice of the World Health Organization (“WHO”).114 The
proposal by the European Communities (“EC”) was subsequently rejected.
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2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 1.
Pascal Lamy, Letter of the Commissioner to Ministers of the WTO (January 7, 2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/medecine/docs/plletter.pdf.
114
Id. See also, EU seeks to break the current deadlock on WTO access to medicines: a multilateral
solution is needed Brussels (January 9, 2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/
pr090103_en.htm. The proposal submitted by the EU outlined 23 infectious diseases that the EC believed
had the most damaging impact on developing countries. In addition to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis, the following additional diseases were suggested: Yellow fever, plague, cholera,
113
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4. Condition Precedent to Using the System: Will Beneficiary Countries Need Prior
Authorization From the WTO to Use the System?
Generally, prior authorization of the TRIPS Council is not required before a
member can utilize the mechanisms established by the Decision.115 However, the
Decision does require that both importing and exporting countries file some
notification with the Council for TRIPS. Countries, other than least-developed
countries (“LDC’s”), intending to use the system as importers must establish that they
have no manufacturing capacity and notify the WTO Accordingly.
The Decision also lays down specific requirements that both importing and
exporting countries utilizing the system must satisfy. Essentially, all countries have
an obligation to ensure that medicines produced under the system are used for their
intended purpose and are not diverted to other countries where they could compete
with brand-name drugs manufactured by the original patent owner.
a) Obligation of Importing Countries: An eligible importing Member must
make a prior notification to the Council for TRIPS specifying the names and expected
quantities of the product(s) needed,116 confirming that the eligible importing Member in
question “has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question,”117 and confirming that, “where a

meningococcal disease, African trypanosomiasis, dengue, influenza, leishmaniasis, hepatitis, leptospirosis,
pertussis, poliomyelitis, schistosomiasis, typhoid fever, typhus, measles, shigellosis, haemorrhagic fevers,
and arboviruses.
115
2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, foot note 2 (“It is understood that this notification
does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system set out in this Decision.”).
116
Id. at para. 2(a).
117
Id. This requirement is waived for least-developed countries (“LDC’s”). The Annex to the Decision sets
out two ways that a country can establish that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector. For the purposes of the Decision on Implementation, LDC Members are deemed to
have insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. For other eligible importing
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pharmaceutical product is patented in its territory, it has granted or intends to grant a
compulsory licence in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the
provisions of this Decision.”118
Importing Members have an obligation to prevent re-exportation of the products
that have being imported into their territory under the system. To ensure that the products
imported under the system are used for the public health purposes underlying their
importation, eligible importing Members are required to “take reasonable measures
within their means, proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade
diversion to prevent re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into
their territories under the system.”119
b) Obligation of Exporting Countries: Several obligations are imposed on
exporting countries utilizing the system. First, such an exporting country must first issue
a compulsory license in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Second, the
compulsory license issued by the exporting Member must contain certain conditions. It
must stipulate that “only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this production
shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs to the Council for
TRIPS.”120 It must also stipulate that “products produced under the licence shall be

Members, insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in question can be established in
either of two ways. One way is for the Member in question to establish that it has no manufacturing
capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. Where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in the
pharmaceutical sector, it has to examine this capacity and determine that, “excluding any capacity owned or
controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the purposes of meeting its needs.” In the later
case, the system ceases to apply when it is established that such capacity has become sufficient to meet the
Member's needs.
118
Id.
119
Id. at para. 4.
120
Id. at para. 2(b)(i).
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clearly identified as being produced under the system set out in [the Decision on
Implementation] through specific labelling or marking.”121 The exporting country must
also require that “[s]uppliers …distinguish such products through special packaging
and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that such
distinction is feasible and does not have a significant impact on price.”122 Finally, an
exporting country must require that before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a
website “the quantities being supplied to each destination”123 and “the distinguishing
features of the product(s).”124
A third requirement placed on an exporting member pertains to notification. An
exporting Member is required to notify the Council for TRIPS of the grant of the license
and the conditions attached to it.125 Finally, an exporting member who has granted a
compulsory license under this system has an obligation to pay “adequate remuneration”
to the patent holder pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement.126
c. Obligations Imposed on Other WTO Members: All WTO Members are
required to take necessary measures to prevent diversion. Members also agree not
challenge actions taken by countries under this Decision. Paragraph 10 stipulates that
“Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of
the waivers contained in this Decision under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article
XXIII of GATT 1994.”
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2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para, 2(b)(ii).
Id.
123
Id. at para. 2(b)(iii).
124
Id.
125
Id. at para. 2(c) (“The information provided shall include the name and address of the licensee, the
product(s) for which the licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the
country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of the licence.”).
126
Id. at para. 3.
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5. Safeguards against Diversion:
Measures against diversion are directed at preventing goods from being diverted
from their intended purpose. In the course of negotiations on the Paragraph 6 issue,
pharmaceutical companies expressed fear that cheaper drugs produced under compulsory
license may be diverted to rich country markets where a different pricing system exists.
To address this, all WTO Members are obliged to “ensure the availability of effective
legal means to prevent the importation into, and sale in, their territories of products
produced under the system set out in this Decision and diverted to their markets
inconsistently with its provisions, using the means already required to be available under
the TRIPS Agreement.”127
6. Surveillance and Review Mechanism
The Council for TRIPS assumes a new monitoring role under the Decision.
Paragraph 8 stipulates that the Council for TRIPS “shall review annually the functioning
of the system set out in this Decision with a view to ensuring its effective operation and
shall annually report on its operation to the General Council.”128 The notifications
required of exporting and importing countries also go to the Council for TRIPS.
7. Technology Transfers
The Decision recognizes the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology
and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem
identified in paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. Consequently, the Decision calls on
eligible importing Members and exporting Members to use the system in a manner that
would promote the objective of technology transfer. Paragraph 7 contains a vague
127
128

2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 5.
Id. at para. 8.
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undertaking by Members “to cooperate in paying special attention to the transfer of
technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector.”129

D. The Statement of Understanding
The original draft of the Decision was unacceptable to the U.S. and to the
pharmaceutical industry. 130 To achieve a much needed consensus on the paragraph 6
question, it became necessary for the Chairperson of the General Council to adopt a
statement to accompany the Decision. The Statement of Understanding was issued
essentially to placate the United States and the pharmaceutical industry and to ensure that
WTO Members arrived at a consensus before the biennial meeting of the WTO
Ministerial Conference. The Statement of Understanding has four important clauses: a
good faith clause, an anti-diversion clause, a transparency clause, and a peaceful and
expeditious settlement of dispute clause.
According to the Statement, WTO Members “recognize that the system that will
be established by the Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health” and
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Id. at para 7.
When a draft of the Decision (known as the “Motta text”) was circulated in December 2002, the United
States was the only country that refused to endorse the text. On top of the Motta text, the U.S. government
demanded: that any solution be restricted to "humanitarian use" (a vague clause that many feared could
disqualify normal generic production); an “opt-out” clause that will hinder the economic viability of the
solution; heavier burdens on suppliers to change the packaging of products made under this system; and a
“review mechanism” to monitor the diversion of generics back into wealthy markets. See Oxfam, US seeks
further restrictions on generic medicines for developing countries (August 25, 2003), US seeks further
restrictions on generic medicines for developing countries, available at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/
pr030825_TRIPS_health.htm (discussing how several NGO’s involved in the Paragraph 6 question –
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Oxfam, Health Action International (HAI), Third World Network (TWN)
and the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) – have found additional demands by the U.S. to be a
threat to the access of poor countries to needed medicines because they are, in effect, a “redundant layer of
bureaucracy that can easily be manipulated to pressure countries out of the system.”).
130
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“not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives.”131 The
Statement also contains an understanding among Members that the purpose of the
Decision would be defeated if products supplied under the Decision are diverted from
their intended market. Consequently, Members agree that “all reasonable measures
should be taken to prevent … diversion in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the
Decision.”132 The Statement, however, specifically states that “[i]t is the understanding of
Members that in general special packaging and/or special colouring or shaping should not
have a significant impact on the price of pharmaceuticals.”133
The Statement also calls on Members to “seek to resolve any issues arising from
the use and implementation of the Decision expeditiously and amicably.”134 To ensure
transparency, the Statement of Understanding requires that notifications made under
paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the Decision pertaining to eligibility of importing country include
information on how the Member in question established that it has insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.
The Statement of Understanding also confirms the new monitoring role of the
TRIPS Council. Essentially, “[a]ny Member may bring any matter related to the
interpretation or implementation of the Decision, including issues related to diversion, to
the TRIPS Council for expeditious review, with a view to taking appropriate action.”135
Any WTO Member who has concerns that the terms of the Decision have not been fully
131

Statement of Understanding, supra note 90.
Id. The Statement notes that the provisions of paragraph 2(b)(ii) pertaining to the obligations of
exporting countries with respect to labeling “apply not only to formulated pharmaceuticals produced and
supplied under the system but also to active ingredients produced and supplied under the system and to
finished products produced using such active ingredients.”
133
Id. Regarding special packaging and labeling, the Statement notes the fact that in the past and for
different reasons, companies have developed procedures to prevent diversion of products. Attached to the
Statement, is a “Best practices” guideline that draws upon the experiences of companies.
134
Id.
135
Id.
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complied with, “may also utilise the good offices of the Director General or Chair of the
TRIPS Council, with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution.”136

E. Conclusion
After all the battles over access to medicine and the relationship between
patent rights, the TRIPS Agreement and public health, what exactly has been achieved?
What can countries that are members of the WTO legitimately do to ensure that essential
medicines are available and affordable?
WTO Members have at least five options. First, where patent exists on a desired
medicine, developing countries can still attempt to meet their needs by dealing directly
with the patent holder through normal commercial arrangements and through aid
programs such as donations and discounts.137 Second, also where patents exist on a
desired medicine, a WTO Member with manufacturing capacity has the flexibility under
the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration to grant compulsory license to permit
the manufacture of generic versions of the same product.138 Third, where a WTO
Member has insufficient or no manufacturing capability, such a Member can, without
compulsory license, import generic pharmaceutical products manufactured in another
country provided there are no patents on the pharmaceutical in question in the importing
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Id.
Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, at para. 7 (“First, difficulty
would be expected to arise only in situations where the supply of the pharmaceutical in question has not
been provided by the patent holder through normal commercial arrangements or through discount,
donation, or other aid programs. A TRIPS-based solution can also only be expected to be effective where
Members have, or are provided, the resources necessary to procure pharmaceuticals under the terms of a
TRIPS-consistent compulsory licence, which includes the provision of adequate remuneration to the patent
holder.”).
138
Id. at para. 8.
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country and in the prospective exporting country.139 Fourth, where there are patents in
both the importing and exporting country, compulsory license would need to be issued in
both countries before medicines could be exported.
Although the 2003 Decision on Implementation appears to be a victory for
developing countries, its usefulness is yet to be tested. During negotiations the World
Health Organization (“WHO”) and civil society groups had recommended a much
simpler, workable, and economically viable solution: allowing generic production for
export as a limited exception to a patent right. There are fears that the Decision creates a
costly and cumbersome process that could ultimately discourage generic production.

IV.

ACCESSING GAINS; MAPPING PROGRESS: THE MERITS AND
DEMERITS OF THE 2003 DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION

The objective of both the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on
Implementation was to ensure speedy and low priced supplies of essential medicines to
those in countries in need of them, while maintaining a legal environment that rewards
inventors for their investment and encourages research and development into new
products. Several questions inevitably arise. Will the adoption of the Decision enable
countries in need of affordable medicines to import them quickly and easily from generic
manufactures in other countries? Is the solution transparent and economically feasible?
Will the Doha Declaration and the Decision ensure that needed drugs are available on a
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In general, developing countries are not required to establish a patent protection regime under the TRIPS
Agreement until January 1, 2005. Thus, a developing country with manufacturing capacity and no patent
laws can manufacture and export patented drugs without a compulsory license.
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sustained basis? Altogether, is the solution crafted in the Decision expeditious, workable,
transparent, sustainable and legally certain?140
The questions are pertinent because although the 2003 Decision of
Implementation is seen in some quarters as a balanced solution to the Paragraph 6
question,141 many NGO’s are critical of the Decision.142 Critics argue that the Decision is
140

Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 29 (arguing that “[w]hile
each option suggested by Members has some merit, at this stage we believe an expeditious, workable,
transparent, sustainable and legally certain solution may more likely be achieved through either a
moratorium for dispute settlement or a waiver of the obligation in TRIPS Article 31(f).”).
141
On August 30, 2003, Shannon Herzfeld, Senior Vice President, International Affairs of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (“PhRMA”), issued a statement that read in part:
With the unanimous adoption of the Menon Statement and the Motta text, we are pleased
that these negotiations have come to a conclusion…. The two decisions that the General
Council reached today – the Motta text and the Chairperson’s statement – will ensure
that the system will not be abused. The additional clarifications contained in the
Chairperson’s statement add strong provisions to prevent diversion, and increase the
likelihood that the solution will benefit patients in the world’s poorest countries as
envisioned in the Doha Declaration. Taken as a whole, this solution reaffirms the critical
role of patents in the development of new medicines.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, Statement from Shannon Herzfeld, PhRMA’s
Senior Vice President, International Affairs in reaction to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on
TRIPS and Public Health, http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/30.08.2003.841.cfm
142

In a Joint NGO Statement issued on September 10, 2003, twenty-one NGOs criticized several aspects of
the 2003 Decision on Implementation. According to the Joint NGO statement:
These are the main problems with the rules:
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

The WTO is requiring the issuance of two compulsory licenses when the new mechanism is used.
The WTO has added many constraints on the business practices of the generic companies.
The WTO deal introduced an extra layer of uncertainty by stating that the system should not be an
instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives, creating uncertainty over the role
that will be played by the businesses that manufacture and sell generic drugs.
The decision leaves unclear whether or not economic efficiency is a grounds for determining a
lack of manufacturing capacity in the importing country. The lack of clarity on this issue has been
defended as a matter of "creative ambiguity", but already the US is telling the Philippines and
other countries that they will oppose "economic efficiency" as grounds for allowing a country to
import generics.
The deal gives the WTO itself new authority to second guess and interfere in the granting of
individual compulsory licenses to generic companies.
The United States and other Developed Economies now have greater opportunities to pressure and
stop developing countries from issuing compulsory licenses.

Joint NGO Statement on TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deals on Medicine: A “Gift” Bound in Red Tape
(September 10, 2003), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos09102003.html [hereinafter Joint
NGO Statement]. The statement was signed by the following organizations: ACT Up Paris; Consumer
Project on Technology; Consumers International; Essential Action; European AIDS Treatment Group;
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intended to “[l]imit the importance of the Doha Declaration,” “[p]rejudice more
fundamental and sustainable fixes to the 31.f problems,” “[c]reate more and not less
uncertainly regarding what can and cannot be done,” and “[g]ive the US and the EU a
big public relations bonanza which will be cruelly use [sic] as the basis for more bilateral
pressure against the use of compulsory licenses and against better export strategies, as
well as a basis to leverage additional concessions from developing countries in other
WTO negotiations.”143 Overall, the belief is that "[t]he new agreement has very modest
benefits,” and that “it has very substantial costs, risks and uncertainties.”144
In this Section, I focus specifically on the 2003 Decision on Implementation in
part because The Doha Declaration has been the subject of a good many law review
articles. I shall review the Decision in the light of some of the perceived concerns of
some of the NGO’s. Three main issues will be taken up. First, I shall examine the
viability and sustainability of the waiver mechanism as a solution to the paragraph 6
question. Second, I shall examine the nature of obligations imposed on prospective
importing and exporting countries to see if they are unnecessarily burdensome, onerous
and an imposition on sovereignty. Third, I shall examine the gaps in the Decision – areas
where the Decision is vague and could potentially create problems in the future for
countries desiring to utilize the system.

Health Action International; Health GAP; International People's Health Council; Médecins Sans Frontières;
OXFAM International; People's Health Movement; SEATINI; Third World Network; Women in
Development; CPTech; HAI; HealthGAP; MSF; Oxfam; and Third World Network.
143
James Love, CPTech Memo, New Chairman's December 16, 2002 Text for para 6 negotiations
(December 16, 2002), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech12162002.html [hereinafter
CPTech Memo].
144
James Love, CPTech Statement, Statement on WTO Deal on Exports of Medicines (August 30, 2003),
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/cptech08302003.html [hereinafter CPTech Statement].
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A. The Waiver Solution
Was the waiver solution the best possible solution to the Paragraph 6 question?
The 2003 Decision on Implementation, which operates as a temporary waiver, offers a
quick solution to a thorny problem but carries with it a lot of legal uncertainty. 145
Compared to a more formal amendment, a temporary waiver carried the advantage of
speed146 and simplicity.147
Although the waiver solution had its advantages, an amendment would have
offered the advantage of permanence, sustainability and legal certainty,148 although
undeniably more time consuming to achieve than a waiver.149 The United States had
opposed an amendment to Article 31(f) on the grounds that actions of countries acting
under an amendment would have been susceptible to legal challenges which would have
marred the legal certainty of the solution.150
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EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para 6 (The EC observed that, “A
waiver or a dispute settlement moratorium could be appropriate and effective mechanisms for a solution,
but they may fall short of providing the type of sustainable and legally secure solution that the EC are
aiming for.”). See also Attaran, supra note 4, at 767 (noting that a waiver is only a temporary solution).
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In the TRIPS Council, the United States has argued that “agreement can be reached on a … waiver
much more easily and quickly than on an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement and further delay would be
required for Members' formal acceptance. Crafting an amendment on which all Members can agree would
delay implementation of the ‘expeditious solution’ beyond the agreed deadline.” See Second
Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 29.
147
Id. (“Should an amendment be adopted, it could prove to be either ineffective or seriously harmful in
practice. A further amendment of the Agreement would be required to correct this situation.”).
148
EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 5 (arguing that an amendment
“offer[ed] the best guarantees for a sustainable, balanced and workable solution.”). See also EC
Communication to the TRIPS Council of 4 March 2002(IP/C/W/339).
149
EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 7. An amendment to Article 31
would fall under the procedural rules set out by Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement and is timeconsuming. Id. The EC noted that an amendment of paragraph 31(f) of TRIPS, as for all amendments of
international agreements, is a procedure that takes time. Id.
150
Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 29 (arguing that “if a
country begins production for export relying on either an authoritative interpretation or an amendment, its
actions could be challenged as being inconsistent with the interpretation or amendment,” and such a
country would only have full legal certainty after the conclusion of a dispute process.).
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Some NGO’s had suggested an authoritative interpretation of Article 30 as a
solution. Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO Members to provide limited
exceptions to patent rights “provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.”151 Article 30 is seen to be politically more workable.152 Article 30 does not
require a government decision each time a pharmaceutical product is needed and contains
no stringent requirements such as the requirement to notify a patent owner of use or to
pay reasonable remuneration to the patent holder.
The Article 30 solution was not favored by the United States or the EC.153
Rejecting this solution, the U.S. argued that Article 30 is “intended to apply to statutory
exceptions already provided for in many countries’ laws at the time the TRIPS
Agreement was negotiated,”154 and that “[i]nterpreting Article 30 to allow Members to
amend their patent laws to permit compulsory licences to be granted to authorize their
manufacturers to produce and export patented pharmaceutical products to other countries
would both unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent and
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.”155
The waiver solution is only temporary. Assessment of the wisdom of the solution
will depend on how speedily WTO Members can adopt a more permanent amendment to
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Id. at para. 31.
Attaran, supra note 4, at 870.
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The EC rejected this idea arguing that “an authoritative interpretation on Article 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement may fail to offer the same level of legal security for all parties involved as a textual addition to
Article 31(f) would do.” EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 6. The EC
questioned the legal merit of the Article 30 solution and thought it was doubtful whether the criteria of
Article 30 offered sufficient scope for such an exception. Id.
154
Second Communication from the U.S. on Paragraph 6, supra note 102, para. 31.
155
Id.
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Article 31(f). Although the Decision set a deadline for WTO Members to negotiate and
adopt such an amendment,156 judging by past negotiating practices at the WTO157 and
serious debates that preceded the adoption of the Decision, it could predictably take much
more time for Members to negotiate and adopt the necessary amendments. Global
corporate actors will predictably attempt to influence the negotiating position of
developed countries governments, thus prolonging the time amendment process.158

B. The Conditions Attached
Does the Decision provide incentive for manufactures to participate and produce
for export or does it de-incentivize generic production? Does the Decision contain
onerous conditions that might discourage countries from utilizing the system? Asia
Russell of Health GAP (an AIDS Activist Organization) has argued that the solution
crafted by the Decision “is a failure for people with AIDS, and people everywhere dying
of treatable diseases”159 because “[i]n the time it would take a generic company to
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The Decision, including the waivers granted in it, “shall terminate for each Member on the date on
which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that Member.” 2003
Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, para. 11. The Decision authorizes The TRIPS Council to
“initiate by the end of 2003 work on the preparation of such an amendment with a view to its adoption
within six months, on the understanding that the amendment will be based, where appropriate, on this
Decision and on the further understanding that it will not be part of the negotiations referred to in paragraph
45 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.” Id.
157
Attaran, supra note 4, at 708 (predicting that negotiations could drag on for years and that during
negotiations, developed countries and pharmaceutical companies will attempt to resuscitate proposals that
were rejected).
158
MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 6 (suggesting that global corporate actors will continue to play a pivotal
role in any future renegotiation of the TRIPS Agreements and that “[t]heir interests are likely to be at the
for front of developed country perspectives on future requirements of intellectual property protection.”).
159
Health GAP Global Access Project, Bush Administration, Big Pharma about to secure disastrous
"solution" on access to medicines at the WTO in effort to boost failing pre-Cancun talks, countries are
poised for sell-out on public health, Press Release ( August 28, 2003) , available at
http://www.healthgap.org/press_releases/03/082803_HGAP_PS_WTO_para6_aug30text.html
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comply with all the conditions set out by the U.S., a patent would likely expire
anyway.”160
Under the Decision, there are at least six steps to acquiring needed medicine
through compulsory license:161
•

Step 1: A prospective importing country must first seek a voluntary license from
the patent owner; such a license is supposed to be on commercially reasonable
terms and for a commercially reasonable period of time.

•

Step 2: If attempt to secure a voluntary license fails, an entity must apply for a
compulsory license to manufacture the medicine locally.

•

Step 3: Where the compulsory license is by a country that has no capacity to
manufacture the medicine locally and the country is not a least-developing
country, such a country must assess its industry’s capacity to produce the
medicine locally, notify the TRIPS Council of its determination that it has no or
insufficient capacity, and explain and justify its decision regarding capacity.

•

Step 4: An importing country must identify and notify a willing exporter in a
country that has sufficient capacity to manufacture the needed medicine.

•

Step 5: The prospective exporter must seek a compulsory license from its own
government.162 In granting the license, the prospective exporting country must
ensure that the conditions stipulated in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement are
met. One important condition is that the exporting country must pay “adequate
compensation” to the patent holder.
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Id.
See 2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14.
162
It is possible that the exporter may be required first to seek a voluntary license from the patent holder.
161
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•

Step 6: If and when a license is granted, the exporter must take adequate
measures as stipulated in the Decision to prevent diversion. In particular, the
exporter must: (a) produce only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the
eligible importing Member; (b) export the entirety of the production to the
Member(s) which notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS; (c) clearly identify
the products produced under the system through specific labeling or marking,
special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products themselves;
(d) before shipment begins, post on a website, the quantities being supplied to
each destination and the distinguishing features of the product(s).

i. Notification Requirements: The Decision creates a somewhat cumbersome
procedure for countries with no or insufficient capacity which does not exist for countries
with manufacturing capacity.163 Although the system is supposed to be automatic, the
TRIPS Council can second-guess a country’s decision to utilize the system and has
enough mandate to interfere and scrutinize the granting of compulsory license.164 Some
NGO’s have expressed concern that the notification requirements would be used to
increase bilateral pressure on weak countries, both exporting and importing.165
Additionally, some organizations have argued that the Decision authorizes
unnecessary intrusion into sovereignty because it authorizes the WTO Secretariat, the
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CPTech Statement, supra note 144 (“The WTO secretariat, the TRIPS Council and the Chair of the
TRIPS council will now begin to routinely review the issuance of individual licenses, and the WTO will
now as a matter of expected practice, oversee the use of compulsory licensing in the most intimate terms,
looking at the terms of individual licenses, evaluating the basis for deciding manufacturing capacity is
insufficient, or reviewing or second guessing any of the new terms and obligations that the new
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TRIPS Council and the Chair of the TRIPS Council to review the use of compulsory
licensing in the most intimate terms . Currently, scrutiny is required on two levels: to
evaluate the basis for a country’s decision that it lacks manufacturing capacity and to
evaluate whether the obligations imposed on both the importing and exporting countries
have been met. Some loss of sovereignty will be inevitable. The Decision was negotiated
on the good faith understanding that it was aimed at addressing the problem of countries
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. It therefore stands to reason that some
kind of review mechanism must be in place to ensure that countries utilizing the system
are those for whom it was crafted.
A more troubling concern is the emergence of three classes of states subject to
three different rules in multilateral system made up of sovereign states and guided by the
principles of equality and non-discrimination. First are states that choose to issue
compulsory license under Article 31 of the traditional TRIPS Agreements; these will be
subject to very minimal scrutiny but are not immune from legal action via the WTO
dispute settlement process. Second are states that issue compulsory license under the
Doha Declaration; these will be subject to some measure of scrutiny and are also
vulnerable to the possibilities of legal action. Third are states with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity and utilizing the system established under the 2003 Decision on
Implementation; these will be subject to more intense scrutiny because the grant of
compulsory license under the Decision is far more complicated than is the case under the
TRIPS Agreement. In return, however, countries utilizing to system receive some
measure of immunity from potential lawsuits.
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ii. Other Conditions: One problem that arises under the 2003 Decision on
Implementation is the need for two separate compulsory licenses to effectuate one import
request. Where a pharmaceutical product is patented in both the importing and exporting
country, a compulsory license will have to be issued in each country. In other words,
compulsory licenses to both exporters and importers would have to be negotiated and
issued on a country-by- country and drug-by- drug basis. A manufacture desiring to
produce for export must therefore first obtain compulsory license from its home country
and ensure that compulsory license is also issued in the importing country. The granting
of two compulsory licenses could create delays due to bureaucratic red tape.

iii. Measures to Prevent Abuses and Trade Diversion
From the beginning, developed countries expressed concern about abuses and
trade diversion166 and called for stringent preventive measures. The prevention of trade
diversion, the EC argued was “of major importance to guarantee the legal security of the
right holders concerned and to preserve the basic principles of the TRIPS Agreement.”167
This explains the stringent conditions imposed on the exporting country and generic drug
companies in these countries. Under the system, generic manufacturers must differentiate
pill size, shape, and color from brand-name products.
Are the safeguards on re-importation inappropriate? There is a legitimate fear that
the safeguards may prove too costly for developing countries and generic manufacturers
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EC, Communications Relating to Paragraph 6, supra note 101, at para. 13 (“It will be in the interest of
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alike and may altogether discourage the use of compulsory licensing.168 Some antidiversion measures are necessary however. Generic drug companies are not paragons of
virtue. To prevent unscrupulous generic producers from exploiting the system for their
own personal gain, some safeguards are called for.
In conclusion, some of the conditions appear to be burdensome, may impose
unnecessary costs on a country wishing to utilize the system, and may delay the delivery
of affordable medicine to people who need it most – the sick and the dying. It becomes a
procedural nightmare when each condition has to be fulfilled over and over again for
each and every drug and for each and every country to whom the drug will be exported.
The Decision appears to take this into account. For example, it provides that “[i]n the
event that an eligible importing Member that is a developing country Member or a leastdeveloped country Member experiences difficulty in implementing this provision,
developed country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and
conditions, technical and financial cooperation in order to facilitate its
implementation.”169

C. Dangerous Vagueness
The fierce negotiation by countries such as the United States, Japan, EU and
Switzerland at the TRIPS Council to introduce numerous limitations and conditions to an
earlier draft of the Decision suggests that the battle over the precise scope of the Decision
may be far from over. In the course of the negotiations, the U.S. government pushed for
strong limitations, including a fixed list of diseases, restriction of the use of the system to
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2003 Decision on Implementation, supra note 14, at para. 4.
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emergency situations and limits on eligible importing countries.170 A major concern now
is that some countries may attempt to exploit the lacunas in the Doha Declaration and the
Decision in furtherance of their narrow interest.171
1. The Scope of Diseases: The Decision is silent on disease scope. It is not
clear whether the system can be used to address routine public health problems or
whether it is limited to epidemics and other major health emergencies.
The preamble to the Decision makes reference to the Doha Declaration.172 This
could mean that the product scope will be defined by paragraph 1 of the Doha
Declaration.173 The first paragraph of the Doha Declaration reads: “We recognize the
gravity of the public health problems, afflicting many developing and least-developed
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics.”174
On the other hand, the Statement of Understanding is very telling. The Statement
of Understanding explicitly notes that some countries will only use the system for
emergencies. It can thus be deduced that the system will normally apply to nonemergencies (including routine public health care). It would be most unwise to restrict the
solution to medicines and medical technologies for the treatment of HIV/ADIS,
170
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tuberculosis and malaria because “[w]hile there is no doubt that these epidemics are
ravaging developing countries, they cannot be considered the sole public health threats in
poor regions – either now or in the future.”
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2. Eligible Importing Members: It is evident that least developed countries or
LDC’s qualify to use the system. The more difficult question arises with respect to other
developing countries. Where a WTO Member is a large (disease-burdened), middleincome country such as Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa, problems may arise
because it may be difficult for such a country to prove to the satisfaction of the TRIPS
Council that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity. The Decision also “leaves
unclear whether or not economic efficiency is a grounds for determining a lack of
manufacturing capacity in the importing country.”176

3. Moratorium on Dispute Resolution? It is not clear whether members who
utilize the system are completely immune from lawsuits under the WTO dispute
settlement procedure. The Decision appears to create a non-binding moratorium by
providing that “Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the
provisions of the waivers contained in this Decision.”177 Much will depend on who has
the final say on whether measures have been taken in conformity with the Decision and
175

See CPTech, US Government efforts to limit the scope of diseases in the implementation of the Doha
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Rosenfield, MD, Dean, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, Michael H. Merson, MD,
Dean of Public Health, Yale University, Laurence G. Branch, Ph.D, Dean, College of Public Health,
University of Southern Florida, Stephen M. Shortell, Ph.D, Dean, School of Public Health, University of
California, Berkeley).
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by what standard such determinations are made. Although the reviewing function rests
with the Council for TRIPS,178 it bears to remember that membership in the Council is
open to representatives of all WTO Members.179 The provision on moratorium falls short
of an earlier suggestion that what was needed was a legally binding moratorium – a clear
determination that actions taken under Article 31(f) would have been non-justiciable.180
Clearly, several provisions of the 2003 Decision could pose major problems for
countries wishing to utilize the mechanism established under it because of their
ambiguity. The situation is made worse by the fact that the legal status of the Statement
of Understanding that accompanies the Decision is not entirely clear. According to the
Chairperson of the General Council, the Statement of Understanding “represents several
key shared understandings of Members regarding the Decision”181 and “the way in which
it will be interpreted and implemented.”182

D. Conclusion
On the positive side, the very fact that 146 WTO Members were able to arrive at a
measure of consensus in order to address the concerns of countries with no or insufficient
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capacity is commendable. Also on the positive side is the fact that the scope of diseases
for compulsory licensing does not appear to be limited as the U.S. initially suggested.
Some of the conditions attached to the Decision are necessary to ensure that cheaper
drugs do not flow back from developing countries to developed countries and to ensure
that pharmaceutical companies recoup their returns on investment.
Some of the fears expressed by several NGO’s are unfounded and lack merit. For
example, some organizations have argued that the Decision “introduced an extra layer of
uncertainty by stating that the system should not be an instrument to pursue industrial or
commercial policy objectives, creating uncertainty over the role that will be played by the
businesses that manufacture and sell generic drugs.”183 Others have argued that the 2003
Decision on Implementation “contradicts the basic principles of the WTO and fair
trade”184 by prohibiting the export of drugs manufactured under the system to rich
countries.185 The argument is that by reducing the size of countries that might import
generic medicine to meet their public health needs it may not be cost-efficient for any
generic manufacturer to participate in the system.186 These organizations would want
generic producers to be allowed to export drugs produced under the new system to
developed countries such as the U.S., Japan, or Australia, on the argument that if such
large markets were excluded, drug production will not be economically efficient and

183

Joint NGO Statement, supra note 142.
Id.
185
Id. at footnote 1 (arguing that the Decision “explicitly accepts a protectionist framework, where rich
countries can export to poor countries, but 23 rich countries were allowed to bar imports from developing
countries.”).
186
Brook K. Baker, Health GAP, Vows of Poverty, Shrunken Markets, Burdensome Manufacturing and
Other Nonsense at the WTO (September 27, 2003) (noting that 23 rich countries, representing 80% of
global drug sales opted out of the export/import option and that ten countries seeking admission to the E.U.
have also restricted their option to import”), available at http://www.healthgap.org/press_releases/03
/092703_HGAP_BP_WTO_Cancun.html.
184

52

attractive to generic firms.187 These lines of argument lack merit and ignore the goodfaith understanding on which the Decision was negotiated. Because the Decision was
crafted to address the health problems of countries with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacity, there is no reason for products manufactured under the system to be shipped to
rich countries.
In the future, controversy may arise on the effect of the Statement of
Understanding. It is currently not clear if and to what extent it eviscerates the Doha
Declaration and if and to what extent it detracts from the terms and conditions of the
Decision.188 Three clauses in the Statement of Understanding could pose a problem in the
future: the good-faith clause,189 the anti-diversion clause, and the transparency clause.

V.

ABUSES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A REVIEW OF
EMERGING CASE LAW (THE U.S. EXAMPLE)

In the U.S., a troubling scenario is unfolding in the pharmaceutical
sector – the increasing resort by pharmaceutical companies to a range of abusive and
anticompetitive practices in an effort to preserve monopoly profits and maintain market
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share. By exploiting loop-holes in a law originally passed to facilitate the speedy entry of
generic drugs into the U.S. markets, some pharmaceutical companies have been able to
either suppress or delay generic competition.
The goal of this chapter is to highlight the different ways pharmaceutical
companies (both brand name and generic) have attempted to “game” a system originally
designed to increase generic competition and improve consumer welfare. By exploring
loop-holes in a law passed to increase generic competition, drug manufacturers in the
U.S. have secured greater profits for themselves without providing any corresponding
benefit to consumers.190 The degree of abuse in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is
reflected in the increasing number of private lawsuits against brand-name companies
and/or generic companies for abuse of patent rights; it is also reflected in the growing
number of antitrust enforcement actions affecting both brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is pursuing.191
Although the U.S. law in issue is very different from the international agreements
under consideration in this article, nevertheless interesting parallels and useful lessons
may be drawn. Many U.S. pharmaceutical companies operate as giant transnational
corporations and are likely to be affected by the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision
on Implementation. Given the tendency of these companies to game a domestic system
designed to improve generic competition despite the strong regulatory oversight of the
FTC and the rigorous anti-trust laws in the U.S., I argue that those pharmaceutical
190
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companies affected by the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation
may also attempt to abuse the system established under these instruments absent strong
oversight at the global level.
To appreciate the tactics used by pharmaceutical companies to either delay or
suppress generic competition in the U.S., an understanding of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“Hatch-Waxman
Amendments” or “Hatch-Waxman”)192 is necessary. Enacted in 1984, the HatchWaxman Amendments changed substantially the law governing approval of generic drug
products by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).193 One of the goals of HatchWaxman was to increase opportunities for market entry by generic drug manufacturers.194
Although the goal of increasing generic drug entry was achieved,195 studies now show
that two main provisions of Hatch-Waxman governing generic drug approval prior to
patent expiration have potential for abuse and are susceptible to strategies that may
actually prevent the availability of more generic drugs.196 In April 2002, the FTC began
an industry-wide study that focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under
Hatch-Waxman. The FTC issued its report - Generic Entry Prior to Patent Expiration:
AN FTC Study – in July 2002.197
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One popular form of abuse is through anticompetitive agreements between brandname and generic drug companies.198 Another form of abuse is the improper listing of
patents by brand-name companies coupled with frivolous lawsuits against generic
companies that have the effect of delaying FTC approval of a generic drug. Some
companies also engage in false and deceptive advertising and marketing practices aimed
solely at discouraging use of generic drugs once they are on the market. Part A provides
an overview of Hatch-Waxman. Part B analyzes some of the abuses in the drug industry
and the anti-trust action the FTC is taking against offending companies. In Part C, I
highlight useful lessons that may be drawn from the United States.

A. The Hatch-Waxman Amendment: Statutory and Regulatory Background
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the “Act”) regulates the manufacture
and distribution of pharmaceutical drugs in the U.S.199 Recognizing that the Act's
“cumbersome drug approval process delayed entry of relatively inexpensive generic
drugs into the marketplace,”200 Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the
Act in 1984.201 One of the rationales behind the Hatch-Waxman Amendments was to
make generic drugs more readily available.202 In fact, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
embody Congress’ attempt to “balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce namebrand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop
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new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic
copies of those drugs to market.”203
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments established new guidelines that simplify the
approval process for generic drugs. Previously, any company wanting to market a new
drug had to secure approval from the FDA by filing a New Drug Application (“NDA”), a
process that is often “time consuming and costly” because a NDA requires companies to
submit specific data concerning the drug’s safety and effectiveness.204 Under the new
guidelines, a generic drug manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) that incorporates by reference the safety and efficacy data developed and
previously submitted by the company that manufactured the original “pioneer” brandname drug. To obtain FDA approval, the ANDA filer must demonstrate that its product is
“bioequivalent” to the pioneer drug.205 To protect the patent rights of the pioneer drug
manufacturer, the ANDA filer must make one of four certifications in its ANDA
concerning patents listed with the FDA for the pioneer drug,206 namely that (1) no patent
for the pioneer drug is listed in the Orange Book (“Paragraph I Certification”); (2) the
relevant patent listed in the Orange Book has expired (“Paragraph II Certification”); (3)
the listed patent will expire on a particular date, and the ANDA filer does not seek FDA
approval before that date (“Paragraph III Certification”); and (4) the listed patent “is
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invalid or ... will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic] drug”
(“Paragraph IV Certification”).207
From a consumer interest standpoint and the standpoint of competition, an
ANDA with a Paragraph IV Certification is dangerous in that it can and does frequently
set in motion a process that could ultimately delay access to cheaper generics for three
years or longer. The regulatory implication of a Paragraph IV Certification is significant;
such an application has the potential to trigger the operation of two provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman – the “30-Month stay” and the “180-day period of exclusivity.”

1. The 30-Month Stay: An ANDA containing a Paragraph IV Certification (an
“ANDA IV”) has “important legal ramification”208 because “it automatically creates a
cause of action for patent infringement.”209 An ANDA applicant making such a
certification must notify the owner of the listed patent upon the filing of such
certification.210 Thereafter, the patent holder has 45 days to initiate a patent infringement
suit against the ANDA applicant.211 If the patent holder does not commence an action
within 45 days, the FDA may approve the ANDA at any time.212 If lawsuit is filed in a
timely manner, the FDA cannot approve the ANDA for at least 30 months.213 Moreover,
the court hearing the patent case may extend the 30-month stay if either party fails to
“reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”214 However, if the court presiding over
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the infringement action determines before the 30-month period expires that the patent at
issue is invalid or not infringed, approval is effective from the date the court decision is
made.215

2. The 180- Day Exclusivity Period: Although potentially dangerous for a generic
manufacturer because it places the manufacturer at risk for a patent infringement lawsuit,
a Paragraph IV Certification carries some advantages. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments
provide that the first company to submit an ANDA IV is awarded a 180-day period of
exclusive rights to market the generic formula of the pioneer drug.216 Prior to the
expiration of the exclusivity period, the FDA cannot approve any other ANDA for the
same generic drug.217 The exclusivity period is triggered by either the commercial
marketing of the generic drug by the first ANDA filer or the decision of a court finding
the pioneer drug’s patent to be invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, whichever is
sooner.218

B. Anticompetitive Practices in the Drug Industry
Paragraph IV Certification has prompted some in the pharmaceutical industry to
employ a number of anticompetitive practices that are currently the subject of private
It seems relatively clear ... that if there is no resolution of the patent litigation and a stay
is not granted, and the patent holder has not obtained preliminary injunctive relief, the
ANDA filer may begin to market its product. In such an instance, the ANDA filer
assumes the risk it might be found liable for infringing the pioneer manufacturer’s patent.
215
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
216
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The 180 days of exclusivity means that “[n]o other generic can go to
market until 180 days after the first generic goes to market or wins the patent lawsuit.” See also David A.
Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 331 (2000)
(“[T]he first generic firm to challenge a patent holder is the only generic firm that can enter; until it enters,
no other generic firm can enter the market.”).
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litigation, FTC investigations and legislative proposals aimed at ensuring fair
competition.
One of these abusive practices is in the form of collusive agreements between
brand-name manufacturers and generic manufacturers aimed at keeping the first generic
off the market, which in turn blocks all subsequent generics from getting to the market.
This arises because as discussed, the first ANDA filer with a Paragraph IV Certification
receives 180 days of exclusivity and sometimes controls the timing of the drugs
introduced into the market.219 Agreement between the first ANDA filer and a brand name
drug manufacturer “can effectively prevent generic competition for the brand name drug
for an indefinite period.”220 In exchange for agreeing not to enter the market, the first
ANDA filer shares in the profits that flow from the brand name manufacturer’s continued
monopoly.221 In one case, a brand-name drug company reportedly paid a generic
manufacturer $4.5 million a month to not market its generic; 222 payments of up to $10
million per quarter are not uncommon.223
Another form of abuse is the improper Orange Book listings that provide the
opportunity for frivolous lawsuits by brand-name manufacturers who thereby trigger the
30-months stay. Because the filing of a patent infringement lawsuit within 45 days of
notice of a Paragraph IV Certification results in an automatic delay of the FDA approval
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of the generic, brand name manufacturers have an incentive to claim, obtain, and list as
many patents as possible in the Orange Book (a practice known as “warehousing” of
patents). This puts brand name companies in a position to bring as many lawsuits as
possible against a Paragraph IV filer. This is possible because “[e]ven a completely
frivolous patent infringement action will preclude FDA approval for up to 30 months,”224
and invalid patents can form the basis for the 30-months stays.
Overall, by illegally manipulating the patent process and the FDA approval
process to delay generic market, brand-name companies sometimes in collusion with
generic companies, accumulate millions in additional sales.225 The ultimate victims in the
patent game are the consumers who are denied access to cheaper drugs.226

1. Collusive Agreements
Allegations that some brand-name companies have paid or attempted to pay
generic companies not to enter and compete are rife. In reaching these agreements, the
companies essentially use the generic company’s rights to the 180-day exclusivity to
impede entry by other generic competitors.227 The FTC has found that frequently a brandname drug manufacturer and the first generic company to file an ANDA containing a
Paragraph IV certification pertaining to a brand-name drug both have economic
incentives to collude to delay generic entry. “By blocking entry, the brand-name
224
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priced 20 to 30 percent below the comparable brand-name drug, but as more generics enter the market,
consumers have more choices, and generic prices drop further.” Families USA, The Drug Industry, supra
note 195.
227
Prepared Statement of the FTC 2003, supra note 190, at 3.
225
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manufacturer may preserve monopoly profits. A portion of these profits, in turn, can be
used to fund payments to the generic manufacturer to induce it to forgo the profits it
could have realized by selling its product.”228 Also, “by delaying the first generic's entry and with it, the triggering of the 180 days of exclusivity - the brand-name and first-filing
generic firms can sometimes forestall the entry of other generic products.”229
In this section, I take a look at on-going private litigation as well as FTC
enforcement actions against some companies. One leading case230 settled by consent
order involved an agreement between Abbott Laboratories (“Abbot”)231 and Geneva
Pharmaceutical, Inc (“Geneva”)232 (collectively “Abbott/Geneva”).233 Since 2000, the
FTC has settled at least three cases against brand-name companies and generic companies
by consent orders.234
a) Private Litigation: In Re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litigation235 (Purchasers vs. Patentee)

228

Id.
Id.
230
See FTC Complaint Against Abbott Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Docket No. C-3945, C3946 (May 22, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945complaint.htm [hereinafter Abbot/
Geneva Complaint].
231
Abbott Laboratories was founded by Dr. Wallace C. Abbott over 100 years ago and is considered today
one of the world’s top health care companies. Abbott became a public company in 1929 and since then its
financial performance has ranked among the best in the world. Company headquarters are in Abbott Park,
Illinois. In 2003 the annual sales were $19.7 billion worldwide. It has been named one of “America’s
Most Admired Companies every year since 1984 by FORTUNE Magazine. See http://www.abbott
com/news/facts/corp.html.
232
As of December 1, 2003 Geneva Pharmaceuticals changed its name to Sandoz. See Media Release
entitled “Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Renamed Sandoz, Inc (December 1, 2003), available at
http://www.us.sandoz.com/site/en/company/news/pool/sandoz_name_launch.pdf. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in the U.S., was a Novartis Company.
Sandoz, a pharmaceutical company established in Switzerland in 1886, merged in 1996 with Ciba Geigy,
forming Novartis Generics. The name change took place “to unite its [Novartis’] generics operations.” Id.
233
See infra notes 249-63 and accompanying text.
234
The consent order in Abbott Laboratories is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/ 03/abbott.do.htm.
The consent order in Geneva Pharmaceuticals is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os /2000/03/geneva
d&o.htm. See also FTC Complaint Against Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Docket No. 9293 (May 8,
2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechst andrxcomplaint.htm [hereinafter Hoechst
Complaint]. The consent order in Hoechst is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/hoechstdo.pdf.
235
261 F. Supp. 2d 188 [hereinafter Cipro Litigation].
229
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In this case (“Cipro Litigation”), purchasers of antibiotic ciprofloxacin
hydrochloride (“Cipro”), and advocacy groups, sued brand name manufacturer, and
prospective manufacturers of cheaper generic version, claiming that agreement under
which proposed manufacturers of cheaper generic version agreed to defer entry into
market until expiration of patent held by brand name manufacturer, in return for
payments to be received from brand name manufacturer, was illegal market allocation in
violation of the Sherman Act § 1 prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade.236
Plaintiffs brought suit against Bayer AG, a German company, and its American
subsidiary, Bayer Corporation (collectively, "Bayer") and Barr Laboratories, Inc.
("Barr"); The Rugby Group, Inc. ("Rugby"); Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. ("HMR"); and
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Watson") (collectively, "Generic Defendants"), alleging
that Bayer and Generic Defendants (collectively, "defendants") entered into agreements
that prevented competition in the market for Cipro in violation of federal and state
antitrust laws.237

236

The court found that the injury requirement for a restraint of trade claim, under the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 26), was not satisfied by allegations that buyers of antibiotic ciprofloxacin hydrochloride
(“Cipro”) were forced to pay inflated prices due to delay of market entry by manufacturers of generic
version of drug, resulting from prospective generic version manufacturers’ settlement of brand name
manufacturer’s patent infringement suit that would have otherwise resulted in judgment against brand name
manufacturer, presenting opportunity to acquire generic version prior to expiration of patent; prospect of
resolution of patent suit, by ruling of invalidity or noninfringement, coming before expiration of patent,
was too speculative. Id.
237
Plaintiffs’ moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for partial summary judgment finding
that these agreements are per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and various
state antitrust and consumer protection laws. Id. at 230-32. Defendants have filed a cross-motion seeking
to dismiss plaintiffs’ respective complaints pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to plead facts sufficient to sustain a Sherman Act violation. Id. at 197-99. These motions present difficult
questions of antitrust law and its interaction with patent rights.
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Bayer manufactures and distributes Cipro and holds the patent for the active
ingredient in Cipro.238 In October 1987, Miles, Inc. (the predecessor to Bayer
Corporation and the licensee of the 444 Patent) obtained FDA approval to market Cipro
in the United States. In a letter dated October 22, 1991, Barr filed ANDA 74-124 for a
generic, bioequivalent version of Cipro. Barr’s ANDA included a Paragraph IV
Certification seeking the FDA’s permission to market its generic drug before the 444
Patent expired on the grounds that the patent was invalid and unenforceable. As set forth
in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, on December 6, 1991, Barr notified Bayer of its
ANDA IV filing and its assertions contained therein regarding Bayer’s 444 Patent. On
January 16, 1992, Bayer commenced a timely patent infringement suit against Barr in the
Southern District of New York, thereby triggering the 30-month statutory waiting period
for FDA approval. Subsequently, in November 1992, Bayer and Barr executed a
stipulation whereby the parties agreed to extend the 30-month waiting period until final
judgment was entered in the patent infringement action. This stipulation was “so ordered”
by Judge Knapp on December 8, 1992. Absent this agreement, the stay would otherwise
have expired on April 22, 1995.
While the patent litigation was pending, in a letter dated January 4, 1995, the
FDA granted tentative approval of Barr’s ANDA for generic Cipro.239 As the trial date

238

In its patent application, Bayer AG claimed the active ingredient in Cipro – ciprofloxacin hydrochloride
– in Patent No. 4,670,444 (the “444 Patent”), which was issued by the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) on June 2, 1987. Id. at 194. The 444 Patent expires on December 9, 2003. Id.
Cipro has been the best selling antibiotic in the United States for many consecutive years and is
described as “the most prescribed antibiotic in the world.” Id. Since 1987, Bayer has been the only
producer of Cipro in the U.S., and, since 1997, Bayer has derived over $1 billion in U.S. net sales of all
Cipro products. Id.
239
Cipro Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 195. Plaintiffs contend that this approval was tentative, rather than
final, due to the parties’ stipulation to extend the 30-month stay. In fact, in its letter to Barr, the FDA stated
that “[i]n certain cases approval can be granted after the expiration of the 30-month period.... In this case,
the 30-month option is not relevant. The [FDA] was advised that on December 8, 1992, the court ordered
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approached, Bayer and Barr reached a settlement that concluded the patent litigation in
the Southern District. In connection with the settlement, on January 8, 1997, Bayer
entered into three separate but interrelated settlement agreements with Barr, HMR and
Rugby,240 and Bernard Sherman (“Sherman”) and Apotex, Inc. (“Apotex”) (collectively,
the “Settlement Agreements”)241 and a supply agreement with Barr and HMR (the
“Supply Agreement”).242 The terms of these agreements form the basis of plaintiffs’
allegations of a Sherman Act violation.
Under the Settlement Agreements, Barr, HMR, Rugby, Sherman, and Apotex
acknowledged the validity of the 444 Patent and additional U.S. Patents held by
Bayer.243 In the Barr Settlement Agreement, Barr also agreed to amend its ANDA to
change its Paragraph IV Certification to a Paragraph III Certification, thereby permitting
Barr to obtain FDA approval to market generic Cipro only upon expiration of the 444
Patent.244 The agreement also provided for an immediate $49.1 million payment from
Bayer to the “Barr Escrow Account.” 245

that the 30-month period be extended[.]” A year later, in January 1996, Bayer and Barr filed cross-motions
for partial summary judgment. Judge Knapp denied the parties’ respective motions in an order and opinion
dated June 5, 1996. Upon a motion by Bayer to reconsider that ruling, the court re-affirmed its decision in a
separate order and opinion dated September 5, 1996. After some postponements, trial of the patent
litigation was finally scheduled to begin on January 27, 1997. See id.
240
On March 29, 1996, Barr and Rugby entered into an agreement pursuant to which Barr agreed to share
equally with Rugby (then a subsidiary of HMR) any rights and profits from the eventual marketing and/or
distribution of Cipro, and, in return, Rugby agreed to finance a portion of the costs and expenses of the
patent litigation (the “Litigation Funding Agreement”). Id.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 196.
243
These patents claim, among other things, starting materials and intermediaries for use in preparing
Cipro, some of the processes for preparing Cipro, and the specific tablet, oral suspension, and intravenous
formulations that Bayer uses in its proprietary Cipro products.
244
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
245
The “Barr Escrow Account” is a bank account established by Barr and HMR to receive payments made
by Bayer. On January 9, 1997, Barr and HMR executed an escrow agreement that established this account
and provided that Barr and HMR each would receive one-half of all funds paid by Bayer into the account.
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In the Supply Agreement, Barr and HMR agreed not to manufacture (or to have
manufactured) Cipro in the United States. In addition, the agreement provided that Bayer
either will (1) supply Bayer-manufactured Cipro to Barr, HMR and Rugby for
distribution in the United States, subject to certain price controls, or (2) make quarterly
payments – varying from $15 million to approximately $17 million – to the Barr Escrow
Account from January 1998 through December 2003 (when the 444 Patent expires). If
Bayer does not license Cipro immediately, it has agreed to do so at a set price if another
generic company successfully challenges the validity of the 444 Patent. In addition,
defendants claim that Bayer agreed to supply Cipro to Barr for marketing under a generic
label beginning six months prior to the expiration of the 444 Patent. To date, Bayer has
chosen to make payments to the Barr Escrow Account, which through December 2003
will total approximately $398 million.246

246

On January 17, 1997, Bayer and Barr each issued a news release announcing the settlement and
discussing the payment scheme set forth in the Supply Agreement. In fact, the press releases note that the
settlement is comprised of two components: (1) an initial cash payment and (2) a Supply Agreement, which
sets forth Bayer’s option to make payments to the Barr Escrow Account or to provide Barr with Cipro that
Barr would market pursuant to a license from Bayer. Also, on January 22, 1997, pursuant to the Barr
Settlement Agreement, Barr filed an amendment to its ANDA 74-124, and in a letter to the FDA dated
January 23, 1997, Barr amended its Paragraph IV Certification to a Paragraph III Certification. See id.
196-97.
Pursuant to the terms of the Barr Settlement Agreement, Bayer and Barr submitted to Judge
Knapp a two-page consent judgment (the “Consent Judgment”) that the parties had negotiated and that
extinguished all claims raised in the patent litigation. On January 16, 1997, Judge Knapp signed the
Consent Judgment in the form submitted by the parties. The Consent Judgment entered judgment for
Bayer, providing that the 444 Patent is valid and enforceable as to, and was infringed by Barr. There was
no mention in the Consent Judgment of the payments Bayer agreed to make to the Barr Escrow Account or
the agreement by Barr, HMR and Rugby not to manufacture and market a generic form of Cipro. The
Settlement Agreements and the Supply Agreement were not filed with or otherwise provided to the patent
court, but the court was appraised of the material terms of the settlement on January 30, 1997 when Bayer’s
counsel forwarded Bayer’s news release to the court. See id.
In July 1997, Bayer voluntarily submitted its 444 Patent to the PTO for reexamination, and, upon
reexamination, the PTO reaffirmed the patent's validity. Since the execution of the Settlement Agreements,
four generic companies have filed ANDA IVs for Cipro and have mounted challenges to the 444 Patent
similar to the challenge raised by Barr. Id. at 197. One challenge was dismissed, see Bayer AG v.
Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., Docket No. 3:98 Civ. 4464 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 1999) (dismissing case per stipulation).
Id. at 197. Two other challenges were unsuccessful, see Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2002), and Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 867- B (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2001)
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Regarding the antitrust issue, the court found no violation. The court thought that
the Settlement Agreements and Supply Agreement did not warrant per se condemnation
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and found that the case “should not be relegated to
the per se category reserved for the most blatant antitrust violations.”247 The court
thought that the plaintiffs failed to show that the Settlement Agreements and Supply
Agreement imposed restraints with anticompetitive effects broader than the exclusionary
effects of Bayer's patent. According to the court:

[w]hile an unfortunate aspect of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is that
pioneer and generic drug manufacturers have often been entering into
mutually beneficial agreements that result in delayed entry of generic
drugs into the market place, the cases that have found such agreements per
se illegal involve findings that the agreements at issue restrained
noninfringing products, delayed generic entry and perpetuated litigation.
Such is not the case here. 248
b) FTC Enforcement Action: Abbott/Geneva249

This case involved an agreement between Abbott and Geneva relating to Hytrin,
Abbott's pioneer brand name drug.250 The FTC complaint alleged that Abbott paid
Geneva approximately $4.5 million per month to delay the entry of its generic Hytrin
product.251 According to the FTC complaint, Abbott's initial patent covering the chemical
compound terazosin HCL expired in or around 1994. Between 1993 and 1995, Geneva

(denying Carlsbad’s motion for summary judgment). Id. At present, Bayer sells the only ciprofloxacin
hydrochloride drug available in the United States. Id.
247
Cipro Litigation, 261 F.Supp.2d at 257.
248
Id. at 256.
249
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
250
Hytrin contains Terazosin HCL a which is used principally to treat benign enlarged prostate and
hypertension. Abbott/ Geneva Complaint, supra note 230, at para. 10-11. Total U.S. sales of terazosin
HCL amount to approximately $540 million per year. Id. at para. 11.
251
Id. at para. 27.
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filed ANDA’s covering a tablet form and a capsule form of generic terazosin HCL252 and
was the first company to file an ANDA for each form.253 Surprisingly, in early 1996,
Abbott notified the FDA of a new patent (‘207 patent) relating to its Hytrin product;
according to FDA procedure, the patent was listed in the FDA Orange Book. In April
1996, Geneva filed a Paragraph IV certification with the FDA and duly notified Abbott of
the Paragraph IV certification.254 On June 4, 1996, Abbott promptly sued Geneva,
claiming patent infringement by Geneva’s terazosin HCL tablet product.255 By filing the
lawsuit within the requisite 45-day period, Abbott’s lawsuit triggered a 30-month stay of
final FDA approval of Geneva’s terazosin HCL tablet ANDA, until December 1998.
However, as the first generic company to submit a Paragraph IV Certification for generic
terazosin HCL, Geneva was also entitled to the 180-day Exclusivity Period promised in
the Hatch-Waxman Act.

The FTC complaint centered around an April 1, 1998, agreement between Abbott
and Geneva. According to this agreement, Geneva agreed not to enter the market with
any generic terazosin HCL capsule or tablet product until the earlier of: “(1) the final
resolution of the patent infringement litigation involving Geneva's terazosin HCL tablets
product, including review through the Supreme Court; or (2) entry of another generic
terazosin HCL product.”256 At Abbott’s insistence, Geneva also agreed not to transfer,
assign, or otherwise relinquish its right to a 180-day Exclusivity Period. In return, Abbott
252

Geneva submitted its tablet ANDA to the FDA in or around January 1993, and its capsule ANDA was
submitted in or around December 1995. Id. at para. 16.
253
Id.
254
By filing a Paragraph IV certification, Geneva was essentially claiming that its generic terazosin HCL
tablet and capsule products did not infringe any of Abbott’s patents covering terazosin HCL, including
Abbott’s newly listed ‘207 patent. Id. at para. 17.
255
It is significant that even though Geneva’s capsule and tablet involved the same potential infringement
issues, Abbott made no infringement claim against Geneva’s capsule product.
256
Abbott/Geneva Complaint, supra note 230, at para. 26.
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agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month in non-refundable payments until a district
court judgment in the parties' patent infringement dispute.257 Why did Geneva enter such
an agreement? To Geneva, the agreement represented the "best of all worlds," because
the company obtained a risk-free “monetary settlement on an ongoing basis until the
litigation was resolved” and still could market its product exclusively for 180 days after
the litigation was over.258

As a result of the agreement, Geneva began receiving monthly payments of $4.5
million from Abbott and refrained from entering the market with its generic terazosin
HCL capsules which was not under litigation. Geneva also refrained from entering the
market with its generic terazosin HCL capsules even after September 1, 1998, when the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted its motion for
summary judgment in its patent tablet litigation with Abbott and invalidating Abbott’s
patent. Under the terms of its agreement with Abbott, Geneva still could not enter the
generic terazosin HCL market until after the Supreme Court either denied Abbott’s
petition for certiorari or disposed of the patent infringement litigation.259 In August 1999,
Abbott and Geneva canceled their Agreement, perhaps as a result of the FTC
investigation; on August 13, 1999, Geneva finally introduced its generic terazosin HCL
capsule product to the marketplace.

257

Id. at para. 27 (Abbott and Geneva also agreed that if the district court declared that Geneva’s tablet
product would not infringe any valid and enforceable claim of the ‘207 patent, Abbott would thereafter pay
the $4.5 million monthly payments into an escrow fund until the final resolution of the litigation. The
understanding was that the party prevailing in the litigation would receive the money in the escrow fund.).
258
Id. at para. 29.
259
On July 1, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, without dissent,
the summary judgment in favor of Geneva. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 10, 2000. Id.
at para. 33.
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The FTC complaint alleged that the Abbot/Geneva agreement, “acted with the
specific intent that Abbott monopolize the relevant market,”260 and “engaged in overt acts
… in furtherance of a conspiracy to monopolize the relevant market, in violation of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended.”261 According to the FTC,
the acts and practices of Abbott and Geneva “had the purpose or effect, or the tendency
or capacity, to restrain competition unreasonably and to injure competition by preventing
or discouraging the entry of competition in the form of generic versions of Hytrin into the
relevant market.”262
The case was resolved by consent order.263 The order prohibited Abbott and
Geneva from entering into settlement (brand/generic) agreements pursuant to which
Geneva agrees not to: (1) enter the market with a non-infringing product, or (2) transfer
its 180-day marketing exclusivity rights. The companies were also required to obtain
court approval for any agreements made in the context of an interim settlement of a
patent infringement action, that provided for payments to Geneva to stay off the market,
with advance notice to the Commission to allow it time to present its views to the court.
Finally, the companies were ordered to give advance notice to the Commission before
reaching a similar agreement in non-litigation contexts.

2. Improper Extension of Monopoly
Brand-name manufacturers in the U.S. also delay generic competition through the
use of improper Orange Book listing which typically triggers the 30-month exclusivity

260

Id. at para. 41.
Id.
262
Id. at para. 34.
263
See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
261
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period under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Improper extension of monopoly achieved through
the improper Orange Book listing strategy typically “involves abuse of the HatchWaxman process itself to restrain trade.”264 Indeed the FTC has found that sometimes,
brand-name drug manufacturers “act strategically to obtain more than one 30-month stay
of FDA approval of a particular generic drug.”265
Improper Orange Book listing could be characterized as a fraud on consumers and
the FDA because oftentimes brand-name companies, motivated solely by the desire to
delay generic entry, falsely and knowingly list invalid patents. The problem arises
because of a loop-hole in the law. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act not all patents are
eligible for listing in the Orange Book and entitled to the special statutory 30-month stay.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for listing only if two conditions are met. First, listing
is called for, if the patent “claims the drug . . . or a method of using such drug.”266
Second, listing is also called for if the patent is one “with respect to which a claim of
patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner of
the patent engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”267 The difference
between listed patents and unlisted patents is that only the former triggers the automatic
30-months stay.268

264

Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission: Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
Presented Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. April 23, 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/02/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm
[hereinafter Prepared Statement of the FTC 2002].
265
Prepared Statement of the FTC 2003, supra note 190, at 3.
266
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1); 355(c)(2); 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (2003).
267
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1); 355(c)(2); 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (2003).
268
See Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
File Nos. 001 0221, 011 0046, and 021 0181: Analysis to Aid Public Comment, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyersanalysis.htm [hereinafter In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company] (noting that in the case of patents not eligible for listing in the Orange Book, a branded firm still
can sue a generic company for patent infringement, but under ordinary federal litigation procedures and
without the benefit of an automatic 30-month stay). In case of unlisted patents, to prevent sale of the
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Brand-name companies are increasingly exploiting loop-holes in Hatch-Waxman
and the FDA approval processes to the detriment of consumers. This arises because,
despite the serious legal and competitive implications of Orange Book listings, “it is
private parties, rather than the FDA, that in practice determine whether patents are
listed.”269 Regarding the Orange Book listing, the role of the FDA is solely ministerial.270
Not only is the role of the FDA ministerial, generic applicants have no right to bring an
action to challenge an NDA holder’s Orange Book listing as improper, the Federal
Circuit has held.271 The overall result is that FDA’s listings do not create any
presumption a patent is correct.272 Nevertheless, as long as a patent remains listed, a
brand-name company “can continue to benefit from the availability of an automatic 30month stay of FDA approval of ANDAs, by initiating a patent suit against generic
applicants.”273
Because the FDA accepts the Orange Book listing at face value, brand name
companies can defraud the system through improper listing.274 The net result is that
“brand-name companies are increasingly listing in the Orange Book, and suing on,
multiple patents, and that these are frequently patents that have been listed after an

generic product before conclusion of a law suit, “a branded firm must obtain a preliminary injunction,
which requires that it demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, among other factors.” Id.
269
Id.
270
Id. (“The FDA has repeatedly stated that its role in patent listings is solely ministerial and that it lacks
the resources and expertise to scrutinize patent information in the Orange Book.” Thus, “[e]ven when a
generic applicant disputes a patent listing, the FDA merely asks the NDA holder to confirm that the listed
patent information is correct. Unless the NDA holder itself withdraws or amends its listed patent
information, the FDA will not remove the patent listings from the Orange Book.”).
271
Id. See also Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1329-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
272
Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that
“the FDA’s listing should not create any presumption that [a] patent was correctly listed.”).
273
In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
274
See, e.g., American Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (observing that
the FDA “has refused to become involved in patent listing disputes, accepting at face value the accuracy of
NDA holders' patent declarations and following their listing instructions.”).
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ANDA has been filed.”275 In some cases (where the patent is obtained and listed after the
generic applicant has filed its ANDA) multiple 30-month stays were possible; the FTC
has found that additional delay of FDA approval (beyond the first 30 months) ranged
from four to 40 months.276

a) Private Litigation: In Re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation277 (Generic
Company vs. Patentee)
In this case, competitors filed antitrust claims against Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company (“BMS”)278 alleging that the company engaged in anti-competitive conduct by
improperly extending its monopoly over buspirone hydrochloride (“buspirone”), an antianxiety drug sold under the brand name BuSpar. On February 14, 2002, District Judge
John G. Koeltl granted in part and denied in part Bristol-Myers motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' antitrust and related state law claims.279
The competitors allege that BMS attempted to extend and/or extended an
unlawful monopoly over the market of buspirone tablets in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.280 The allegation is that through fraudulent patent filings with the FDA,
BMS caused the agency to list the patent in question in the Orange Book and as a result
blocked generic competition with its BuSpar product. Essentially, the FDA was
precluded from approving the generic version of buspirone once BMS listed its ‘365

275

Id.
Id.
277
In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Buspirone
Patent Litigation – Bristol-Myers].
278
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company is a pharmaceutical company headquartered in New York City. In 2002
it reported $18.1 billion in global sales. See www.bms.com/aboutbms/data/.
279
Buspirone Patent Litigation – Bristol-Myers, supra note 277.
280
15 U.S.C. § 2
276
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Patent281 in the Orange Book.282 Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that BMS made a bad
faith attempt to interfere with the generic competitors’ entry into the buspirone market.
This is alleged to have been done by asserting to the FDA that the ‘365 patent covered
the approved uses of buspirone when BMS knew that these assertions were false. They
also claim that BMS pursued patent infringement suits – thereby obtaining an automatic
stay of the FDA’s approval of the generic version of buspirone subsequent to 21 U.S>C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), with knowledge that the stay was obtained by making false statements
to the FDA.283 Currently, this litigation is still in its initial phases and the court has not
ruled on any substantive anti-trust or patent issues. While the private lawsuit is still
pending, the FTC has commenced enforcement action against BMS and announced that a
consent agreement had been reached.

b) FTC Enforcement Action:
i. Biovail (Tiazac)284
The first FTC enforcement action to attempt to remedy the effects of an allegedly
anticompetitive Orange Book listing was against Biovail Corporation (Biovail).285 In the
complaint, the FTC charged that Biovail illegally acquired an exclusive patent license
and wrongfully listed that patent in the Orange Book for the purpose of blocking generic
competition to its branded drug Tiazac. As a result of the listing, Biovail was able to
commence an infringement lawsuit against Andrx, thus triggering triggered a 30-month
281

This, of course, is the patent in controversy within the patent infringement portion of the case.
In re Buspirone Patent Litigation, 208 F.R.D. 516, 518.
283
Id. at 520.
284
See FTC Complaint Against Biovail Corporation (April 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2002/04/biovailcomplaint.htm [hereinafter Biovail Complaint].
285
Biovail Corporation describes itself as a “full-service pharmaceutical company, engaged in the
formulation, clinical testing, registration, manufacturing, sale and promotion of pharmaceutical products.”
See http://www.biovail.com.
282
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stay of FDA final approval of Andrx’s generic Tiazac product. According to the FTC
complaint, Biovail knew that the new patent did not claim the form of Tiazac that it had
been marketing, and Biovail did not need this new patent to continue marketing Tiazac
without infringement risk. The FTC further alleged that Biovail misleadingly represented
to the FDA that the new patent claimed existing-and-approved, rather than revised-andunapproved, Tiazac, to avoid de-listing from the Orange Book and termination of the stay
against Andrx. According to the complaint, Biovail’s patent acquisition, wrongful Orange
Book listing, and misleading conduct before the FDA were acts in unlawful maintenance
of its Tiazac monopoly, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act286 and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.287
On April 23, 2002, the FTC announced that it had accepted for public comment
an agreement and proposed consent order with Biovail Corporation.288 The consent order
required Biovail to divest the illegally acquired patent to its original owner, dismiss its
infringement case against Andrx thus allowing entry of generic Tiazac, and to refrain
from further action that may trigger another 30-month stay on generic Tiazac entry. The
consent order also required Biovail to give the FTC prior notice of acquisitions of patents
that it intended to list in the Orange Book for Biovail's FDA-approved products.

ii. In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
In an April 14, 2003 complaint, the FTC charged that BMS engaged in a series of
unlawful acts to delay competition from generic versions of three of its major drug
286

Biovail Complaint, supra note 284, at para. 54-57. Section 5 of the FTC Act is found at 15 U.S.C.§ 45.
Biovail Complaint, supra note 284, at para. 50-53. Section 7 of the Clayton Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §
18.
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The consent order in the Biovail matter is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/biovaldo.pdf
[hereinafter Biovail Consent Order].
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products.289 The FTC subsequently announced that it has accepted for public comment
an agreement and proposed consent order with BMS which is intended to settle the
charges against the company.290 In its complaint, FTC alleged that BMS abused
governmental processes in order to delay generic competition to the three prescription
drugs, and, in particular, that it misused the regulatory scheme established by Congress to
expedite the approval of generic drugs.291 In issue was BMS’s activities relating to three
of its prescription drug products: BuSpar, an anti-anxiety agent; and two anti-cancer
drugs, Taxol and Platinol. The complaint relating to BuSpar is discussed here.
BMS began selling BuSpar in 1986. By 2000, BuSpar sales in the United States
were over $600 million. In anticipation of the expiration of its ‘763 patent pertaining to
BuSpar in November 2000, the FTC complaint alleged that BMS filed a new patent
application with the PTO in 1999, involving the use of buspirone to create the metabolite
of buspirone.292 After repeated rejection of its patent application by the PTO, BMS
succeed in obtaining a patent (patent ‘365) only hours before patent ‘763 was about to
expire.293 BMS proceeded to submit the ‘365 patent details to the FDA for listing in the
Orange Book. The complaint further alleged that BMS's ‘365 patent “did not meet either
of the statutory requirements for listing a patent in the Orange Book, because it does not
claim BuSpar or a method of using BuSpar, and it is not a patent with respect to which a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted against someone selling
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In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
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A metabolite is the new molecule created when a pharmaceutical agent breaks down in the body.
293
BMS was repeatedly rejected because the company had been making and selling BuSpar to treat anxiety
in the U.S. for nearly 14 years. Patent ‘365 was issued only after BMS request a patent that claimed solely
the use of the metabolite of buspirone - not the use of buspirone itself.
290
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BuSpar.”294 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that “[a]lthough BMS knew that it had
only obtained a patent claiming a method of using a metabolite, it nonetheless submitted
a declaration to the FDA affirming that the ‘365 patent claimed a method of using
BuSpar, in order to list the patent in the Orange Book.”295 Worse, after ANDA filers on
BuSpar asserted to the FDA that the ‘365 patent did not meet the criteria for listing in the
Orange Book, BMS intentionally made an additional false and misleading statement.296
The FDA without making any independent determination regarding the scope and
coverage of the ‘365 patent, accepted at face value BMS’s statements and, thus, deemed
the ‘365 patent listed in the Orange Book as of November 21, 2000. The FTC complaint
charged that BMS “knew that its representations to the FDA - to the effect that the '365
patent claimed a method of using buspirone - were false and misleading,”297 but
nevertheless “made these misrepresentations purposely and intentionally, to obtain an
improper Orange Book listing of the ‘365 patent.”298 As a result of its wrongful listing in
the Orange Book, BMS “illegitimately acquired the ability to trigger a 30-month stay,
thereby delaying entry of generic buspirone and depriving consumers of lower prices and
other benefits of competition.”299 It is pertinent to note that generic competition to
BuSpar occurred only after the ‘365 patent was removed from the Orange Book in March
2001, following a district court decision ordering BMS to seek de-listing.300
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In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
Id.
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Id. (“The FDA asked BMS to provide a declaration that the ‘365 patent contains a claim for an
approved use of buspirone. BMS responded with a declaration expressly affirming that the ‘365 patent does
in fact claim the approved uses of buspirone, a statement that was false and directly contradicted
representations BMS made to the PTO to obtain the ‘365 patent.”).
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Id.
298
Id.
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Id.
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See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). The Federal Circuit later
reversed this ruling on jurisdictional grounds. See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1329295
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The FTC also alleged that the patent infringement suits BMS brought against
ANDA filers for infringement of the ‘365 patent “were objectively baseless and filed
without regard to their merits”301 and that the intent and effect of BMS’s suits “was to
wrongfully trigger the 30-month stay as a means of preventing generic buspirone
manufacturers from marketing their products.”302 Entry of a lower-priced generic version
of BuSpar would have resulted in a significant, immediate decrease in the sales of the
BMS’s brand-name drug and would have led to a significant reduction in the average
price for the products in the relevant market, hence the motivation to game the system.
FTC thus charged BMS with engaging in acts that willfully maintained its monopolies in
buspirone in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The proposed consent order,303 bars BMS from seeking to list the ‘365 patent in
the Orange Book in relation to any NDA in which the active ingredient is buspirone. The
proposed order also contains general prohibitions “designed to deter improper listings
and to prevent BMS from triggering the Hatch-Waxman automatic 30-month stay in
circumstances that could improperly block generic entry.”304 The consent order also
contains a general prohibition on false statements to the FDA.305 Regarding the

33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the court held that no private right of action existed under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act to seek de-listing).
301
In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268.
302
Id.
303
See Biovail Consent Order, supra note 288.
304
Id. (“Paragraph VI would bar BMS from Orange Book listings that are contrary to the statutes and
regulations governing such listings. For example, this provision would prohibit listing patents in the Orange
Book that do not actually claim the drug product at issue…. In addition, Paragraph VII bars BMS from
acting to obtain or maintain a Hatch-Waxman 30-month stay on FDA approval in certain specified
situations.”)
305
The purpose was “[t]o ensure that BMS does not seek to obstruct generic competition through false
statements to the FDA outside the Orange Book listing context, such as through the citizen petition
process.” See In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, supra note 268. (“Paragraph VIII bans false
and misleading statements to the FDA that are material to the approvability or sale of a generic version of a
BMS brand-name drug product, unless BMS had a reasonable belief that the statement was neither false nor
misleading.”). Id.

78

allegations that BMS engaged in sham litigation, the proposed consent order bars BMS
from “asserting any patent infringement claim that is objectively baseless; or seeking to
enforce a patent that BMS knows is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed..”306

The Orange Book listing scheme established by the Hatch-Waxman Act naively
assumed that brand-name companies (as NDA holders) would act in good faith in listing
patents.307 However, there is mounting evidence that listings are made in bad faith (to
block generic competition) and are not based on a reasonable, good faith belief that the
patents listed are listable. As the FTC has noted “the Orange Book listing scheme is
susceptible to opportunistic behavior” and brand-name companies (as NDA holder)
frequently exploit the listing scheme by obtaining patents and listing them in order to
block FDA approvals of generic rivals when the NDA holder does not reasonably expect
the patents to ultimately hold up in court.308

C. Conclusion
The goal of this section was to highlight how a law enacted in part to stimulate
generic competition and thereby expand consumer access to cheaper alternative lifesaving drugs has been hijacked by brand-name drug manufacturers, sometimes in
collusion with generic drug manufacturers. Brand-name drug companies have
traditionally been viewed with suspicion. However, as the case studies highlight, generic
drug companies are no saints either. Given the proper incentive, some generic drug
companies may be willing to delay or disrupt competition and keep drug prices
306
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308
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artificially high. Collusion between the generic companies is also possible and is
increasingly the focus of FTC enforcement actions. The FTC has identified two
potentially competition-reducing categories of agreements that merit the agencies close
attention.309
It is disheartening that drug manufacturers can brazenly engage in fraudulent,
anticompetitive practices in a country like the United States with state-of-the-art antitrust
laws, a plethora of consumer protection laws, a sound judicial system that provides
avenues for those harmed to seek recourse, and a strong public regulatory and
enforcement agency such as the FTC able to monitor the activities of the companies
concerned. None of these mechanisms are readily available at the global level. There is at
present nothing to stop a pharmaceutical company intent on exploiting loop-holes in the
Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation to delay generic
competition.
In theory, the combined effect of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration
and the 2003 Decision on Implementation will be that developing countries will have
more opportunities to obtain essential pharmaceutical products at reduced prices.310
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Prepared Statement of the FTC 2002, supra note 264. The first are agreements that involve exclusive
distributorship arrangements. Under such an arrangement, a second generic entrant, rather than bringing a
competing product to market, might agree to become the exclusive distributor of the first entrant.
Essentially, such an arrangement guarantees the second entrant an agreed-upon share of the market. In
return the first entrant is against aggressive price competition. The second category of agreements involves
division of market segments. Under such an arrangement, the first generic entrant might agree to market its
product exclusively in one market, while the second entrant agrees to market its product exclusively in
another. The overall objective of such agreements is to impede vigorous competition.
310
Countries facing health emergencies can: (i) acquire needed medicine directly from brand-name
pharmaceutical companies; (ii) acquire patented drugs through parallel marketing channels; (iii) ensure
availability of generics through compulsory licensing that enables local manufacture; and (iv) procure
generics from another country through the compulsory licensing scheme established under the 2003
Decision on Implementation; (v) acquire generic products from licensees of brand-name companies in
situations where the company has voluntarily licensed its patent.
As hitherto explained, where the prices of pharmaceutical products are lower in a foreign market,
parallel import permits a government to allow the importation of such products into the national market so
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However, an examination of the nature and intensity of competition in the pharmaceutical
sector in the U.S. suggests that abuse of patent rights is very rife in the industry and that
in many instances brand-name pharmaceutical companies will deploy a host of abusive
and anti-competitive practices in an effort to protect their market share and maximize
their profit. A study of on-going litigation in U.S. courts and antitrust enforcement
actions brought by the FTC, including both branded and generic drug manufacturers,
indicates that generic drug companies are not paragons of virtue; given adequate
incentive, some generic drug companies will engage in anti-competitive practices that
ultimately hurt consumers. In the U.S., although the existence of a plethora of anti-trust
and consumer protection legislation and the presence of the FTC has helped to keep
abuses in the pharmaceutical industry to a bare minimum, companies are still finding
ingenious ways to evade the law and the watchful eyes of the FTC. The obvious lesson is
that frequently, well-intended laws are not enough to ensure that medicine is available to
those who need it most.
With respect to the war over access to medicine in developing countries,
therefore, I argue that despite the laudable goals of the Doha Declaration and the 2003
Decision on Implementation, there are serious potentials for abuse in the industry. These
abuses could ultimately work to deprive the suffering men and women in the Third World
of the intended benefit of the two texts. In other words, as attention moves away from the
emotive issue of HIV/AIDS and attempts are made to use compulsory licensing to secure

as to offer drugs at more affordable prices. See Submission by the African Group, supra note 79, at para.
26 (“For developing countries, in particular, least-developed countries and smaller economies, “parallel
importation” can be a significant way of increasing access to medications, where the prices charged by
patent holders for their products are unaffordable. Moreover, in situations where the local manufacture of
the product is not feasible, and therefore compulsory licences may be ineffective, parallel importation may
be a relevant tool to ensure access to drugs.”).
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the manufacture of drugs needed to treat other diseases, pharmaceutical companies may
be tempted to employ a host of abusive practices in an effort to safeguard their turf.
I envisage at least six possible types of abuses. First, collusive agreements
between brand-name companies and generic drug companies may begin to emerge; under
these agreements, generic companies may agree to refrain from requesting compulsory
license to manufacture generic versions of pharmaceutical products in return for payment
or exclusive distribution arrangements. Second, collusive agreements between generic
companies may also begin to emerge under which the companies agree to inflate prices
and engage in other monopolistic practices. Third, abuses in the form of serious attempts
by brand-name pharmaceutical companies to influence the decision of eligible importing
and exporting countries may begin to emerge regarding whether and when to issue a
compulsory license. Fourth, the world may begin to see abuses in the form of attempts by
brand-name companies to delay or block generic competition altogether by challenging
the bioequivalence of generic drugs. Fifth, brand-name companies may attempt to
undermine the 2003 Decision on Implementation by persistently raising questions about
whether exporting countries and manufacturers have satisfied all the requirements
stipulated in the Decision, particularly requirements relating to safeguard and antidiversion.311 Sixth, although a remote possibility, companies may also engage in false
marketing practices aimed at either confusing the general public about the safety of
generic drugs or discouraging doctors from prescribing generic drugs.
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Médecins Sans Frontières, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, One Step Forward, Two Steps
Back? Issues for the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference (Cancun 2003), at 3, available at
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/Pre-CancunBriefing.pdf. The system may also be abused by
governments. Pressure may be brought on developing countries to forgo their privilege under the Decision.
Moreover, in the context of bilateral and regional trade negotiations, developed countries may push for
tighter patent protection than is envisaged under TRIPS.
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Abusive practices of multinational companies can adversely affect the trading
environment in developing countries and burden consumers with inflated prices for
pharmaceutical products. In the United States, the Sherman Act has been particularly
useful in addressing monopolistic practices in the pharmaceutical sector. If and when
pharmaceutical companies resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade and
adversely impede prompt access to generic drugs, what laws are available to address
these practices? Do developing countries and least-developed countries have the requisite
legal and institutional capacity to deal with domestic and transborder anticompetitive
practices? Are there global trade rules that address potential abuses of patents by right
holders? Is there a need for a multilateral agreement on competition? Should such an
agreement be developed within the framework of the WTO? Will the development of
such rules be in the overall interest of developing countries?
The questions are pertinent because the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision
on Implementation cannot in and of themselves prevent the abuse of patent rights by drug
companies. These questions will be briefly addressed in Section VI. As will be seen,
many developing countries currently lack the necessary legislation and/or enforcement
powers to deal with abusive practices of transnational corporations, and are thus among
the most vulnerable to the effects of anti-competitive activities of international cartels. At
first glance, therefore, a multilateral rule on competition would appear to be in the
interest of developing companies. A multilateral framework on competition policy could
ensure that developing countries have the capacity and tools to deter and remedy anticompetitive practices. Paradoxically, developing countries have resisted efforts to
negotiate a global competition rule within the framework of the WTO.
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VI. BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE BLUE SEA:
IS A GLOBAL COMPETITION RULE THE ANSWER?

In this section, I examine existing global trade rules that address anti-competitive
behavior in the pharmaceutical sector, evaluate current efforts towards the development
of a global competition rule within the framework of the WTO, and highlight the special
concerns of developing countries regarding these initiatives.

A. The Treatment of Abusive and Antitrust Practices under the TRIPS Agreement

Several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement address anti-competitive practices by
private actors.312 Article 8(2) stipulates that: “[a]ppropriate measures, provided that they
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse
of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.”313 In granting compulsory license under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement
to remedy an adjudicated violation of competition, a WTO Member may ignore some of
the conditions stipulated in the Agreement that are intended to safeguard the interests of
the patent holder.314 Furthermore, in determining the amount of remuneration to be paid
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MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 65 (observing that during negotiations for the TRIPS Agreement,
developing countries pushed for the inclusion of anti-competitive measures).
313
Id. at 65 (noting that article 8(2) is broad and is designed to address the abuse of contractual licensing
agreements.).
314

Article 31(k) exempts Members from applying the conditions in subparagraphs (b) and (f) “where such
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive.”
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a
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in such cases “[t]he need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into
account.”315

Concerned that patent holders may attempt to impose anti-competitive provisions
in contractual licensing agreements, Article 40(2) allows WTO Members to specify in
their legislation “licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute
an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market.” Members may also “adopt, consistently with the other provisions of
[the TRIPS Agreement], appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which
may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and
regulations of that Member.”316 Article 40 also establishes a mechanism for
extraterritorial investigation and enforcement and creates conditions for cooperation
through the supply of necessary information.317

Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
public non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of
public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or
has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right
holder shall be informed promptly;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use;
315
Article 31(f) of TRIPS Agreement.
316
Article 40(2). A WTO Member who has cause to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is
a national or domiciliary of another WTO Member is undertaking practices in violation of the its laws and
regulations, and which wishes to secure compliance with such legislation, may request for consultations
with the Member whose national is in violation. Article 40(3) stipulates that each Member to whom a
request for consultation has been directed, “shall enter, upon request, into consultations” with the State
requesting the consultation. It also provides that “[t]he Member addressed shall accord full and sympathetic
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for, consultations with the requesting Member, and
shall cooperate through supply of publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to the matter
in question and of other information available to the Member, subject to domestic law and to the conclusion
of mutually satisfactory agreements concerning the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting
Member.”
317
MATTHEWS, supra note 22, at 65.
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The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement give some room for WTO Members to
address patent abuses and anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector. One of
the primary mechanisms envisaged in the TRIPS agreement for dealing with anticompetitive practices is compulsory licensing. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not
fully deal with problems that could potentially arise after a compulsory license has been
issued, that is, practices that operate to delay or suppress the entry of generic competition
even after a compulsory license has been issued. Furthermore, a measure of legal and
institutional sophistication is required to effectively utilize the existing provisions of the
agreement – something that many developing countries currently lack.

B. Is a Global Competition Rule Necessary?
In the last twenty years there has been a growing call for the development of
multilateral rules on anti-competitive practices.318 The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade did not provide binding rules on restrictive business practices with the result that to
date, efforts to establish global rules to deal with restrictive business practices have only
resulted in non-binding codes of conduct.319 In 1995, the then WTO Director-General,
Renato Ruggiero, observed that there was “an urgent need for a dispassionate analysis at
the multilateral level of the overall links between competition policy and trade policy,
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Bernard Hoekman, Competition Policy and the Global Trading System: A Developing Country
Perspective (World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 1755), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/org/research/trade/pdf/wp175.pdf (observing that starting in the late 1980s an
increasing number of academics and policy makers began calling for the development of multilateral rules
on anticompetitive practices).
319
Id.

86

notably to identify the problems that may require action and the options for such
action.”320 The EU communication of June 1996 put competition squarely on the
international agenda.321
Until then, the work in the WTO on competition policy had largely taken the
form of responses to specific trade policy issues, rather than a look at the broad picture.322
At the first regular biennial meeting of the WTO at the Ministerial level in 1996 in
Singapore,323 Trade Ministers reached an agreement to establish a WTO Working Group
on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (“WGTCP”) to look more
generally at the relationships between trade and competition policies.324 Trade ministers
also agreed to establish a working group on trade and investment.325 The task of the
WGTCP was merely analytical and exploratory.326 The WGTCP was authorized only “to
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World Trade Organization, Economic globalization increases impact of national competition policies on
International Trade- says Renato Ruggiero, Press Release of November 20, 1995, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres95_e/rome1.htm.
321
Karel Van Miert, The WTO and Competition Policy: the Need to Consider Negotiations, Address Before
Ambassadors to the WTO in Geneva, April 21, 1998; available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
speeches/text/sp1998_038_en.html.
322
World Trade Organization, Competition Policy, available athttp://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
comp_e/comp_e.htm.
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Trade Ministers met in Singapore from December 9-13, 1996 for a Ministerial Conference as mandated
by Article IV of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
324
World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on December 13, 1996,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/wtodec.htm. Since 1997, the WGTCP has
reported annually to the General Council. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Group on
the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/7 (July 17,
2003) [hereinafter 2003 Report of the WGTCP]. For the Working Group's previous reports on its activities
see: in 1997 (WT/WGTCP/1), 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2), 1999 (WT/WGTCP/3), 2000 (WT/WGTCP/4), 2001
(WT/WGTCP/5) and 2002 (WT/WGTCP/6), available at http://docsonline.wto.org. In the Singapore
Ministerial Declaration, ministers agreed to “establish a working group to study issues raised by Members
relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in
order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework.” See supra.
325
Id. at para. 20 (“we also agree to … establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade
and investment.”).
326
It was agreed that the Working Group will not negotiate new rules or commitments and that future
negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in the area of trade and competition policy “will take
place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members regarding such
negotiations.” Id.
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study” the interaction between trade and competition policy.327 The General Council was
mandated to keep the work of the WGTCP under review, and to determine after two
years how its work should proceed. In 2001, the mandate of the WGTCP was
extended.328
Since 1996, the efforts of the EU and countries like Japan to move the agenda
towards negotiations on a multilateral framework of competition rules have been largely
unsuccessful.329 While some members call for a multilateral agreement on competition
policy, others strongly oppose the idea.330 Although there appears to be a consensus
among WTO Members on the need to address transborder anti-competitive practices,
there is a divergence of opinion on how this problem should be addressed. Discussions in
the WGTCP have revolved around some core topics that reflect areas where intense study
and further discussions are still needed. In the ensuing section, I will discuss three related
issues: (i) the pros and cons of a multilateral agreement on competition; (ii) the structure
of any proposed framework and the need of such framework to reflect traditional WTO
principles such as the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and procedural
fairness; and (iii) the elements of progressivity and flexibility that should be included in
any multilateral framework on competition policy to be adopted together with questions
327
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The Doha Declaration mandated that negotiations on a global competition rule could start after the 2003
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session on modalities of negotiations.” See supra note 9, at para. 20.
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In 1999 Japan called for a global agreement on competition. See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference on Trade and Competition (“Members
should agree to put the item of competition law and policy on the agenda of the next WTO negotiations
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World Trade Organization, Trade and Competition Policy http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
inist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/16comp_e.htm (noting that “a number of Members have renewed the call
for a WTO framework to support the implementation of effective national competition policies by
Members and enhance the overall contribution of competition policy to the multilateral trading system
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relating to technical assistance, capacity building and special and differential agreement
for developing countries.

1.

The Pros and Cons of a Multilateral Rule: Several arguments are

frequently advanced to support the call for a multilateral rule on competition including
the difficulty of individual countries effectively addressing transborder restrictive
practices and the need for a more comprehensive, consistent and coherent approach to
anti-competitive practices in the global market place instead of the current case-by- case
approach to transborder restrictive practices,331 the need to ensure that the gains from
liberalization are not undermined by anti-competitive behavior of private actors,332 and
the belief that “an international framework of competition rules would contribute to the
development of international trade” by removing barriers to access to markets.333 It is
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Id. (“In today’s global economy, there are numerous anti-competitive practices which have an
international dimension and which therefore come under the jurisdiction of different competition
authorities. This may result in conflicts of law and jurisdiction and might make it difficult for competition
agencies to deal with transborder restrictive practices.”).
332
2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para. 14 (“Experience had shown that liberalizing trade
and encouraging foreign direct investment heightened the dangers posed by anti-competitive practices such
as cartels. A multilateral framework would reinforce the application of competition law and policy at the
national level and thereby strengthen Members’ ability to address these challenges.”).
333
Id. (“There is also a general consensus that competition policy is a key factor in supporting the
competitiveness of industry, in protecting a sound functioning of the economy, and in maximising
consumer welfare.”).
According to Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, in a speech
delivered at Harvard University in 1996:
“But if we have succeeded in getting the rules of competition between countries to work
effectively, that very success requires us to go further and consider how the behaviour of
companies can serve to distort international competition. We will need to see whether
there are any areas where explicit competition rules, or specific understandings, are
necessary internationally to complement the statutes that many governments already have
on their books. I have no doubt that competition rules are essential to the proper
functioning of markets - what we need to clarify, however, is how best to promote such
disciplines, both nationally and internationally.”
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also argued that the development of a multilateral agreement on competition policy
would “act as an impetus towards building a culture of competition;”334 “encourage
countries without a competition policy to adopt one;”335 and “ensure that progress made
through previous trade and investment liberalization initiatives at multi-lateral, regional
and bilateral levels, is not negated by private anti-competitive activities.”336 These
arguments are aptly summed up in the 2003 report of the WGTCP. According to this
report:
A multilateral framework on competition policy would establish a
coherent set of principles for sound competition policy among all
Members, without imposing a harmonized approach, and would promote a
more transparent and predictable climate to encourage foreign trade and
investment. It would also contribute to the building of institutional
capacity in developing countries, and would assist Members lacking a
competition law in drafting an appropriate law and establishing an
enforcement authority. Cooperation in the context of a multilateral
framework offered the prospect of shortening the time frames that
developing countries would need to build and embed competition laws and
policies that would support their development goals; a key consideration
in this regard was the more supportive environment it would provide for
better-targeted assistance and capacity building. Finally, an agreement
would encourage beneficial cooperation among Members which was
important given the increasing prevalence of cross-border anti-competitive
activities.337

While acknowledging the need for a global rule on competition,338 developing

Renato Ruggiero, Director-General, World Trade Organization, The Global Challenge: Opportunities and
Choices in the Multilateral Trading System, The Fourteenth Paul-Henri Spaak Lecture, Harvard University,
October 16, 1995, available athttp://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres95_e/pr025_e.htm.
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Competition Bureau, Consultations on the Competition Bureau’s Paper “Options for the
Internationalization of Competition Policy” – Increased International Cooperation on Competition Policy,
available at http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/vwGeneratedInterE/ct02112e.html. The
Competition Bureau is an agency of the Canadian Government responsible for maintaining and
encouraging fair competition in Canada.
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Id.
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2003 Report of the WGTCP, supra note 324, at para. 13.
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Id. at para. 18 (“Most developing countries now acknowledged the need to implement a national
competition law or policy, out of their own self-interest.”). See also World Trade Organization, Working
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countries are reticent about the development of such a framework.339 There are several
reasons for this. First, for many poor countries, competition policy is overshadowed by
higher priorities.340 Second, developing countries are afraid that a multilateral framework
may not “allow for the preservation of policy space in regard to developmental
objectives.”341 Third, developing countries are very worried about the direct financial
cost associated with implementation of such a framework.342 Fourth, apart from the
financial implications of implementing a global competition rule, developing countries
are also concerned about additional difficulties that could arise as a result of “disparities
between countries and/or their firms in respect of levels of development and
competitiveness, experience in the adoption or implementation of competition laws and
the capacity to implement such legislation.”343 Fifth, some countries are concerned about
the potential scope of any proposed framework in terms of the types of abusive practices
that would be addressed and the place of existing WTO principles of transparency, nondiscrimination and procedural fairness in any proposed multilateral framework on
competition policy.344 Finally, developing countries also fear that a multilateral
agreement on competition would be used as a pretext to open markets for Northern-based

Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from Malaysia,
WT/WGTCP/W/239, July 24, 2003 (“Malaysia acknowledges that a competition policy seeks to ensure
efficiency in the market place. There is growing awareness on the need to develop some kind of regulatory
control on anti-competitive conduct of firms and multinational companies as the existence of such practices
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corporations rather than address the anti-competitive behavior of multinational
corporations and their impediments to development.345

2. Structure of a Potential Multilateral Framework:
What would be the structure of a potential multilateral framework in terms of the
breadth and depth of possible obligations that members will be expected to assume? Will
harmonization of national competition laws be an objective of the framework? What core
principles would be integrated into the framework? Would there be sufficient flexibility
built into the framework taking into account the differences in the situation of WTO
Members? These questions are pertinent because paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration –
the paragraph that extended the mandate of the WGTCP – specifically calls attention to
them.346
Discussions in the Working Group indicate that there is a general consensus that
hardcore cartels must be addressed in any proposed future rule. Developing countries
welcome this focus.347 Hardcore cartels have been described as “the most unambiguously
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25.
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to hardcore cartels.”).
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harmful of competition law violations.”348 Hardcore cartels are bad because they impose
heavy costs on the economies of countries, particularly countries that lack effective tools
to deal with them.349 Although discussions at the WGTCP suggest that there is a growing
consensus that hardcore cartels should be addressed, there is currently, no generally
accepted definition of a hardcore cartel. There is therefore a need for a clearer definition
of hardcore cartels and further discussions on what approach should be adopted in
dealing with them.
The possible inclusion of WTO principles of non-discrimination, transparency
and procedural fairness into any proposed framework is a major concern for some
developing countries and civil society organization. For example, Malaysia expressed the
concern that transparency requirements may be used to impose additional burdens on
developing countries.350 Kenya has questioned the wisdom of universalizing principles
developed in the context of trade policy.351 Martin Khor, Director of Third World
Network, argues that increasing advocacy by Northern governments for application of the
principles of non-discrimination, national treatment and transparency reflect a hidden
agenda to give foreign corporations, whether as suppliers through exports or by local
investments and franchising, equal – if not better – treatment than that given to local
enterprises.352
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3. Flexibilities, Progressivity, Technical Assistance, Capacity Building and
Special and Differential Treatment

The adoption of a multilateral framework on competition policy would also
undoubtedly involve heavy administrative burdens for many developing countries,
particularly countries that currently lack competition legislation and institutions.353
Consequently, appropriate flexibility and progressivity elements “supported by
continuing commitments with regard to technical assistance and capacity building”354
would be necessary. It is also important that any multilateral framework on competition
policy “take cognisance of, and accommodate, a substantial degree of pluralism in
national competition policies, especially among developing countries, in addition to
other, sometimes more interventionist, policies that existed to support development.”355
For many countries, the startup process would be beset by numerous financial and
administrative problems;356 some countries will need technical assistance in establishing
an effective regime. It is therefore important that provisions relating to technical
assistance and capacity building be fully fleshed out.357
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C. Conclusion
Competition laws and policies are necessary both for the overall wellbeing of an
economy and for the protection of consumers. In general, effective competition law and
policy help ensure efficiency in the marketplace and a robust competitive environment.
Arguably, a multilateral rule on competition could be in the interest of developing
countries.358 A global competition rule could contribute to the development of
institutional capacity in developing countries, assist developing countries currently
lacking competition law in drafting appropriate legislation, and encourage beneficial
cooperation among WTO Members. Such a multilateral framework could strengthen the
ability of developing countries to address dangerous anti-competitive practices in the
pharmaceutical sector and in other sectors.
However, given a myriad of socio-economic problems and developmental
objectives, negotiations on competition law-related matters may not be a priority for
many developing countries. In the context of limited resources and growing obligations
under a host of international trade agreements, the resources of many developing
countries may be better directed at more important socio-economic policies.359 In
addressing anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector, developing countries
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may be content to simply utilize the tools presently available under the TRIPS
Agreement.360
Some of the fears expressed by developing countries regarding any proposed
agreement on competition policy are not overstated.361 Whether a global competition rule
will be in the interest of developing countries will depend on the extent to which the
interests of developing countries are fully reflected in any future agreement. It is
important that any proposed multilateral framework does not simply become a
smokescreen for promoting market access for transnational corporations and imposing on
developing countries, anti-trust laws of more developed WTO Members. One of the
purposes of any future multilateral agreement on competition should therefore be to
address the challenges currently faced by developing countries, for example through a
focus on those anticompetitive practices that developing countries are most vulnerable to.
Firm and effective commitments regarding capacity building, technical assistance and
special and differential treatment provisions would also be necessary.
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Although important, it is not enough that harmonization will not be the goal of
any proposed framework.362 While there are convincing arguments for why a multilateral
framework on competition policy may be in the interest of developing countries, there is
a strong need to take into account a country’s level of development when formulating
such an agreement and establishing obligations regarding implementation. Paragraph 25
of the Doha Declaration buttresses this fact by stating that in discussions on the
modalities for a potential multilateral framework, “[f]ull account shall be taken of the
needs of developing and least-developed country participants and appropriate flexibility
provided to address them.”363
Overall, should a multilateral framework on competition be negotiated, there
would be a need to consider (i) the different levels of development and economic
circumstances of WTO Members; (ii) the different legal, social, and cultural context of
Members; (iii) the difference in availability of resources for implementing the terms of
any proposed framework; and (iv) the different levels of institutional development and
the fact that Members have different administrative systems.364 Thus, rather than attempt
to impose a one-size-fits-all standard, as is the case with the TRIPS Agreement, a
proposed set of principles that “would embody common values and promote cooperative
approaches to competition law enforcement” would be a useful starting point.365 In the
final analysis, it may be important to “preserve the right of a country to choose whether
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and when to have a competition law and the kind of competition policy to adopt.”366

VII. CONCLUSION
To a great extent, the war over access to medicine in developing countries was
unnecessary because the TRIPS Agreement appeared to provide sufficient policy spaces
aimed at attenuating the potential adverse effects of a strong intellectual property regime.
The war was inevitable, however, given the numerous ambiguities that existed in the
TRIPS Agreement, the negotiating history of TRIPS Agreement,367 and the
understandable efforts by the pharmaceutical industry to safeguard their profit margins
using every means possible. The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated at a time when the
impact of a strong patent protection was not widely understood in the developing world
and at a time when the debate on the necessity of a global intellectual property regime
was dominated by global corporate actors and countries with intellectual property
expertise.368 Today, not only is the relationship between patent protection and economic
growth more understood, new actors “whose views were peripheral in the Uruguay
Round negotiations have now entered the debate on global intellectual property
protection more wholeheartedly.”369
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The battles over the precise relationship between patent rights, public health and
state sovereignty reflect the simultaneous convergence of a number of trends that together
define the emerging world of the twenty-first century including: the growing convergence
of national economic systems, widening disparities of income and development, the rise
in the power and influence of transnational corporations and the explosion of diseases
that transcend national boundaries.370 In the twenty-first century, drugs matter because of
their role in equitable and sustainable development and because many developing
countries have little or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector371 and
have little resources to devote to R&D in essential medicine.372 Also, in the twenty-first
century, as a result of globalization, transnational corporations in general and
pharmaceutical companies in particular are having to assume new global responsibility
that they did not have before.
Compulsory license gives developing countries tools to address serious health
problems by enabling them to obtain generic drugs at an affordable price.373 Although an
important instrument in efforts to protect public health, compulsory licenses alone “will
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not address all the problems related to public health.”374 This is because there are many
other factors that influence access to medicine in developing countries including: level of
research and development; quality of diagnosis; capacities of health systems and budget;
the quality of drugs; and adequacy of health care professionals.375 Given the multiplicity
of factors that influence access to medicine, a combination of policies is needed to ensure
that drug prices are lowered on a sustainable basis.376
The different battles may be over but the war against diseases in developing
countries continues. For one thing, it is not clear yet whether developing countries will
actually maximize the political space now afforded by the Doha Declaration and the 2003
Decision on Implementation. Furthermore, experts rightly note that “[e]ven with newly
discounted price for patented anti-retroviral drugs and even with dramatically cheaper
equivalents from generic producers, developing countries and their private citizens will
find it impossible to buy significant quantities of life-saving AIDS medicines without
significant and sustained support from the international community.”377 To date,
multilateral funding for AIDS treatment has been very poor; very little has changed since
the establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the
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“Global Fund”) in 2001. The Global Fund suffers from serious under-funding.378 Most
important, given the possibilities of abuse in the pharmaceutical industry, the future will
depend on the type of rules that exist to address abusive and anticompetitive practices by
drug companies, the extent of self-regulation that exists in the industry, the role of ethical
codes of conduct in the industry, and the extent to which external pressures can be
brought to bear on the pharmaceutical industry. In this respect, actors such as civil society
groups have a pivotal role to play in any effort to address the growing global influence of
transnational pharmaceutical industry, raise awareness about any abuses in the industry
and provide countries with timely information that will be needed to address abuses if
and when they arise.
Just as many factors influence access to effective medicine, “many actors have a
role to play in addressing the access crisis.”379 At the local and national level,
governments clearly “have the responsibility to give priority to public health through
strong, pro-health legislation.”380 Attention must now turn to other issues affecting access
such as inadequacies in the health infrastructure of many developing countries.381 Unless
these issues are addressed, many in the developing world will remain without access to
essential drugs even if the drugs are offered at extremely low cost or for free.382
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At the international level, organizations such as the World Health Organization, World
Bank and UNAIDS must “adopt and advocate for policies that give the highest level of
protection for public health.”383 Alongside continuing efforts to reduce the cost of
medicine through generic competition, concurrent research and advocacy on additional
barriers to access is called for.384 Renewed commitment to support the United Nations
Global Funds to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis is also called for.
The private sector remains very important. Pharmaceutical companies can
contribute to long-term solutions by cutting their prices for developing countries in a
transparent and predictable way.385 Differential pricing thus remains a viable option.386
International donors and foundations remain very important also. In addition to funding
disease prevention, international donors can fund drug purchase and other treatment
programs.387 Finally, civil society groups have a continuing responsibility to monitor and
hold accountable all the important players – states, international donors, pharmaceutical
companies – and to expose abuses and other failures when they occur.
It is important that the integrity of the patent system is preserved through good
faith use of the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision on Implementation. The patent
system is needed to finance new research and development and ensure that drug
manufacturers continue to bring newer and better drugs to the market. However, studies
in the U.S. and elsewhere show that the industry’s emphasis on R&D is somewhat
exaggerated. Data gathered by Families USA, does show that in the U.S. at least, major
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pharmaceutical companies “spend significantly more on marketing, advertising, and
administration than they spend on R&D.”388
The access to treatment debate unearthed many hidden factors that impede access
to essential drugs for millions in the developing world.389 In addition to increasing access
to essential drugs in developing countries, the debate brought the human rights to health
back into the spotlight.390 The access to treatment debate raised interesting questions
about how to balance ethical concerns and economic concerns.391 Public health is an
ethical and human rights issue, but does it necessarily trump substantial economic and
other public interests at stake when patent rights are implicated?392 What constraints
should society impose on the rights of a patent holder? Can the pharmaceutical industry
be trusted to develop sound ethical principles to guide the activities of its members?
These questions and more will continue to resonate many years from now.
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